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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy and securities law I intersect along one of the wilder frontiers in
modem business law.2 While bankruptcy has always been a risk faced by
investors, and has been mentioned as such in standard securities law disclosure,
that risk has not generally been perceived as a complex one requiring special
kinds of disclosure. Rather, the standard disclosure has tended to take a
conclusory form to the effect that the business is walking along a ledge and that
there is a small but nontrivial risk that it might fall off. Disclosure of this kind
treats bankruptcy simply as an end point, a worst-case scenario. 3
Bankruptcy has become a risk that is too common and complex to be
treated as a simple black box for securities law disclosure purposes. This is
true, even in bankruptcy-remote disclosure, for initial issues with high
leverage, special structures, or other characteristics raising bankruptcy risk, or
whose purported remoteness from bankruptcy may be particularly sensitive to
certain aspects of the bankruptcy process. 4 It becomes even more important for
securities whose issuers are in more immediate danger of insolvency. Here, the
disclosure becomes especially important to enable the holders of the securities
to make appropriate decisions in workout situations, and for the smooth and
I The term "securities law," for purposes of this Article, will normally refer to federal
securities law. Key provisions of this body of law, both generally and for purposes of this
Article, include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994) (the "1933 Act")
(amended 1995); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)
(amended 1995) (the "1934 Act"); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb (1994); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1994);
and the rules, regulations, and formal letters promulgated thereunder by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). State securities regulation, a substantial topic in its own right,
will not be discussed in depth. The principles of disclosure applied by federal securities law,
this Article's primary concern, also apply under many state statutes, but the latter, which
differ from each other at least as much as they do from federal law, often include review of
the merits of securities offerings. See, e.g., JAMFs D. Cox ET AL., SEcuRrrms REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 49-50, 345-51 (1991); RiCHARD W. JENNiNGS E AL., SECURITmES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1613-59 (7th ed. 1992).
2 The level of flux is well illustrated by the continuing controversy over the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, passed by
Congress over President Clinton's veto on December 22, 1995. Although this Act will raise
some obstacles to bringing private securities actions in general, it does not materially affect
the concerns of this Article. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CI. L.
REV. 1207, 1212-13 (1991).
4 See infra notes 142-213 and accompanying text.
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equitable functioning of the bankruptcy reorganization process if the issuer
invokes Chapter 11.5
Securities investors must now consider both greater risks of bankruptcy
and new kinds of bankruptcy risks. These risks have been created by factors
that include the dynamics of Chapter 11 restructuring, the use of securities to
finance transactions with special bankruptcy risks, such as leveraged buyouts
("LBOs"), and the creation of new and complex instruments such as asset-
backed securities, which may have special sensitivities to bankruptcy.
Disclosure has a major role to play in dealing with these issues, but
bankruptcy-oriented disclosure is currently inadequate to meet the needs of
investors both before and after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The
problems with bankruptcy-oriented disclosure reflect the fact that both
securities law and bankruptcy law follow incomplete models. The imperfections
of both models are highlighted by their interaction.
The securities laws have adopted mandatory disclosure as the central
mechanism for insuring the integrity of the securities markets. 6 As currently
structured and enforced, they reflect the strong influence of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), which posits that the markets are
efficient, reflecting all publicly available information in securities prices. 7 This
model tends to consider disclosure primarily in terms of the most efficient
securities markets-those for common stock. Moreover, its primary viewpoint
deals with the simplest case in trading common stock: the initial public
offering, though that may be updated by continuing disclosure requirements
under the 1934 Act.8 Within this framework, it is particularly difficult to
consider bankruptcy as anything but an endpoint.
Bankruptcy law, on the other hand, has not completely abandoned its early
paradigm as a simple process for liquidating the assets of a debtor and
distributing them to a body of creditors divided, if at all, only into secured and
unsecured categories. Its reorganization provisions, still not completely
integrated into this paradigm, provide a "one size fits all" approach that does
not recognize that those who hold claims against large, publicly held
corporations with intricate structures of debt and equity securities have special
disclosure needs distinct from those who hold claims against smaller, simpler
entities.
5 See infra notes 235-57 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Essay, Financial Transparency and Corporate
Governance: YouManage What YouMeasure, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335 (1996).
7 See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
8 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1052 (1995) (noting that mandatory disclosure evolved more as a
response to agency problems than as an aid to efficiency in the securities markets).
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Anomalies that arise in considering appropriate disclosure of bankruptcy
risks highlight the inadequacy of both models where bankruptcy and securities
law come together. Investors now have choices to make in situations that
diverge widely from the securities law paradigm of initial public offerings for
common stock. They must consider securities with characteristics strongly
different from simple equity, and they must make choices concerning securities
they already own, in markets that are much thinner than equity markets. They
cannot make appropriate decisions concerning insolvency risks-both in terms
of valuing securities, and in terms of exercising voting rights-unless they are
properly informed. Effective disclosure policy should force securities issuers
and those assisting them in the offering process to consider appropriate
insolvency-related disclosure, both at the initial point of issue, and as risks
evolve over time.
This may become particularly difficult as the ingenuity of Wall Street in
creating new types of securities runs past the foresight of legislators and courts
in dealing with the insolvency of their issuers. This further complicates the
disclosure puzzle: Where new kinds of financial instruments are involved,
establishing rights and obligations that have not yet been sorted through by
statute or by litigation, what kind of disclosure of the risks that they pose is
appropriate? In turn, this leads to the even more vexed, and yet central, issue
of circularity: For complex and untested new security structures, such as are
frequently found with asset-backed securities, disclosure of the possibility that a
structure will fail in bankruptcy may in fact help to precipitate that event when
a bankruptcy court actually considers the issue.9 Circularity is a deep anomaly
in the entire framework of disclosure, and the large volume of securities subject
to it make it more than a minor curiosity.
These questions are important because interaction between securities law
and bankruptcy is both close and reciprocal. Not only is appropriate disclosure
of bankruptcy issues needed in order fully to implement the policies behind
securities regulation, but it is also important for the proper function of
bankruptcy reorganization. Although it is clear that, where part of the
solicitation for a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization is conducted before
bankruptcy, proper securities law disclosure is required,10 it is less clear
exactly what disclosure is appropriate, and the circumstances of the
prepackaged Chapter 11 invite disclosure abuses by management. Even in
conventional workouts and Chapter 11 cases, proper prebankruptcy disclosure
may be important to protect security holders from exploitation by claim-
purchasing "vultures," and otherwise to insure that they are properly informed
9 See infra notes 214-34 and accompanying text.
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1) (1994).
[Vol: 57:731
LOOKING UNDER 7BE ROCK
of their rights in bankruptcy."
Deciding what disclosure is appropriate, in all of the above contexts, poses
some particularly obstinate problems. One is dealing with an issue that
securities disclosure law already confronts in other contexts: the problem of
requiring disclosure of "soft" information, Le., forward-looking and opinion-
based information, as opposed to more concrete data on past performance.' 2Another related problem is that of cost. Even if this problem is limited to
direct cost, securities law disclosure is already expensive, and additional
disclosure requirements will add to this cost. This problem is aggravated by the
fact that financially fragile entities-the ones most likely to be required to make
enhanced bankruptcy disclosure-may be those least able to bear the cost.
Moreover, there are significant indirect costs attached to disclosure. The
process of SEC review of proposed disclosure may cause delays that can be
crucial in the transactional context. Furthermore, in our litigious society, new
disclosure requirements invite new and costly litigation. More generally, if
other direct and indirect costs reach too high a level, they may become
significant barriers to entry to the regulated markets, raising overall costs of
credit, sending potential issuers into other capital markets, and possibly
impairing the liquidity of the regulated markets.
Disclosure costs, both direct and indirect, must be seriously considered in
relation to the projected benefits of disclosure.' 3 In this context, it is
worthwhile to examine possible lower-cost alternatives, such as the rating
process. A careful review of possible substitutes for mandatory disclosure
shows, however, that while each may be a valuable adjunct to mandatory
disclosure, it remains indispensable, particularly in the context of potential
strategic behavior by management as a corporation approaches insolvency.
This leaves the question of what disclosure is appropriate. In general,
appropriate disclosure must provide investors with sufficient information to
value their securities and otherwise to decide how best to act with respect to
known risks posed by the bankruptcy process. This type of disclosure will give
different answers at different times and for different types of securities.
This Article seeks to establish a basic framework for dealing with
bankruptcy issues in securities disclosure, including situations where
11 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1209 n.7, 1214, 1223, 1233-42;
Richard Lieb, Vultures Beware: Risks of Purchasing Caim Against a Chapter 11 Debtor,
48 Bus. LAw. 915 (1993).12 See infra notes 106-129 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit
"Manpukaion" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 512-19, 522-23 (1991);
Steve Thel, $850,000 in S& Minutes-The Mechanics of Secuities Manipulation, 79
CORN.LL L. Ray. 219, 287-98 (1994).
1996]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
bankruptcy is not yet in plain sight. Part II will discuss securities law disclosure
policies with respect to insolvency. Part M will discuss whether, in view of the
costs imposed by mandatory securities law disclosure, there may be cheaper
substitutes available, and will evaluate possible substitutes. Part IV examines
the problems inherent in securities law disclosure of bankruptcy-related risk in
situations where bankruptcy is not yet imminent. These include the central
problem of circularity. Part V will discuss continuing disclosure requirements
and their consequences, particularly in the situation where a corporation is
already contemplating insolvency. Part VI will discuss the proper allocation of
liabilities incurred for failures in disclosure and the difficulties inherent in
establishing such liabilities.
II. SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL DISTRES
Securities regulation requires initial and, in most cases, continuing
disclosure of substantially all information that an investor would be likely to
consider important in deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold a given issue or
issues. This information includes not only the expected return on an
investment, but the risks faced by the issuer and holder of the securities in
question. These risks, and the appropriate degree to which they must be
disclosed, will differ depending upon whether the issuer is floating freely or
circling the drain. Having said this, however, the question of what disclosure is
appropriate for a particular security and its respective issuer at any particular
time may involve difficulties that require substantial analysis.
A. Securities Regulatory Policy and the Looming Fact of Bankruptcy
1. The Disclosure Paradigm for Federal Securities Regulation
The federal securities laws are primarily intended to assure full and fair
disclosure to investors. 14 Federal securities regulation, unlike certain state
regulatory schemes, deliberately avoids most policing of the merit of publicly
offered securities 15 and instead seeks to promote and protect fair and efficient
14 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1445 (1994); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 234 (1988); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Cox, supra note 1, at 14; Lowenstein,
supra note 6, at 1339-41.
15 This has slipped in some minor ways in recent years, with attempts to deal with
perceived abuses such as blank-check offerings and aggressive sales of "penny" stocks. See,
e.g., JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 261-63. Nonetheless, the overall philosophy of the
federal securities laws remains committed to disclosure, as opposed to merit regulation. See
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securities markets. It leaves to the markets most decisions concerning the
merits of the securities sold there.16
This disclosure-oriented regulatory structure is designed to accomplish a
number of purposes. It is intended to give individual investors fair access to
information about publicly traded securities. This means both freedom from
fraud and manipulation and relatively equal access to information, regardless of
the investors' means and relationship to issuers. Moreover, it is designed to
maximize the availability of accurate and up-to-date information concerning
securities and their issuers to the more general markets for securities. 17
As currently formulated, this scheme relies to a substantial degree on the
notion that the securities markets are efficient. This means that, as formulated
under the prevailing "semistrong" form of the ECMH,18 market prices quickly
and completely incorporate substantially all publicly available information on
the securities being priced. 19 A consequence of this is that incomplete,
erroneous, or fraudulent information will lead to inappropriate prices. This will
not only cause direct injury to investors in particular transactions, but will
reduce the willingness of outside investors to participate, injuring market
liquidity and the effectiveness of the markets in assuring the efficient allocation
of capital.20
The regulatory structure, in reliance on this model, is designed to insure
that investors without inside information on particular issuers or their securities
will be willing to invest without fear of deception or manipulation and that the
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1344.
16 See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, 7he Federal Secuities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171-72 (1933); Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to
Uniformity In Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. Rsv. 2150, 2159-60 (1991) (contrasting
disclosure philosophy of U.S. securities law with shareholder protective features of
European Economic Community law).
17 See, e.g., Felix Rohatyn, World Capital: 7he Needs and the Risks, N.Y. REV. OF
BooKs, July 14, 1994, at 48, 50-51, 52-53 (U.S.-type disclosure seen as essential for
development of world capital markets).
18 The hypothesis, borrowed from financial economics, takes three forms as most
widely understood: weak, semistrong, and strong. The weak form holds that current prices
incorporate all prior price information, so that future prices cannot be predicted based on
past prices. The strong form, by contrast, holds that securities prices incorporate all
information, whether or not publicly available. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS
OF CoRPORATION LAW 474-79 (1995).
19 See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Effident Markets, and Shelf
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 177-79 (1984); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effidency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 554-59, 569 (1984).
20 See infra notes 24 and accompanying text.
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markets will thus be effective in allocating capital to its most efficient users.
Although subject to both theoretical and empirical criticism, 21 the ECMH has
generally been accepted by the SEC and the courts, as well as by most
commentators in the field. 22 Both SEC regulations and interpretive decisional
law, particularly over the last two decades, view delivery of unmanipulated
issuer information to commodity-type securities markets as the primary
mechanism of securities regulation. 23
The disclosure duties established by this overall scheme of regulation have
three major components. The first two consist of positive duties established
pursuant to overall schemes of registration: the obligation to make full and fair
disclosure when new securities are sold on public markets, chiefly established
by the 1933 Act and the Trust Indenture Act; and the duty to assure fair trading
conditions in the ongoing secondary markets for securities, chiefly by requiring
continuing accurate disclosure of material information, pursuant to the
provisions of the 1934 Act and SEC regulations promulgated thereunder. All of
these provisions establish minimum standards for information that must be
disclosed in registration materials and by registered issuers. They also establish
liability for failure to comply with the disclosure requirements. These
requirements are imposed with comparatively little regard for the transaction
costs of compliance, although the SEC has made some concessions to offerings
by small business.24 The third set of duties is primarily negative in nature: the
21 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Effident Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 770-72, 834-49 (1985);
Burton G. Malldel, Returns from Inves'ng in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN.
549, 549-51 (1995).
22 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 549-51.
23 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 234 (1988).
24 Aside from relatively limited exemptions from the registration process,
comparatively recent SEC regulations have made registration easier for certain small
business issuers, beginning in 1982 with the availability of Form S-18 for certain offerings
of $7.5 million or less in securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.28 (1982). Currently, the SEC has
defined a special category of "small business issuers" to include certain businesses with
annual revenues of up to $25 million. See Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1996). Issuers in
this category are entitled to make certain offerings on Forms SB-1 and SB-2, which have
somewhat less onerous financial reporting requirements than more conventional forms. See
Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10, 239.9, -. 10 (1996). On the other hand, for offerings
that do not meet the requirements for these simplified forms, smaller, less seasoned
businesses may actually incur higher registration costs than larger, older ones, because they
may have to use the more elaborate Form S-1 rather than the somewhat simplified S-3.
Larger issuers may also save on certain costs through mechanisms such as the shelf
registration process established by Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1996). Regardless of
which form is used, however, the issuer's ability to pay has little to do with the demands
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duty not to engage in fraudulent or manipulative practices. The most famous
expression of this set of duties is in Rule lOb-5,25 promulgated pursuant to
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 26 The antifraud rules apply to a substantially
wider spectrum of transactions, including sales of securities well after their
initial registration, and to persons involved in the sale of securities whose
registration is not required by the 1933 Act or otherwise.27
2. Insolvency and the Disclosure Paradigm
Insolvency introduces a threadbare patch into this fabric of disclosure.
Even for issuers remote from insolvency, markets for debt securities are less
liquid and otherwise differ significantly from the commodity-like equity
markets assumed by the ECMH.28 Reorganizations, including workouts
conducted in the shadow of bankruptcy and full-fledged Chapter 11 cases,
diverge even more sharply from the model. They operate in drastically thinner
and less transparent markets for securities of financially troubled issuers than
the markets contemplated by the ECMH, with fewer actual and potential
participants and substantially increased asymmetry of information between
potential buyers and sellers. 29 Reorganizations thus cast significant doubt on
whether disclosure policies appropriate to general markets are adequate to meet
the needs of investors in financially troubled issuers.30
imposed on it by the securities registration system.
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 22 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 1994) (antifraud
provisions apply even to private sales of securities to sophisticated buyers). Section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2), also forbids misrepresentations and material omissions in
the sale of securities, whether or not their registration is required by the 1933 Act. See,
e.g., Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1992). It is not as widely
used as section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5, however, because courts have tended
to limit its applicability to the initial distribution of securities. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1070-71 (1995). For a criticism of the controversial Gustafson
decision, see Brian E. Burns, Comment, Red Means Green: The Disruption of the Statutory
Construction Process in Gsstafson to Haronize Section 12(2) and Rule lob-5 Private
Liability Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 OHIO ST. L.J (forthcoming Nov.
1996). See also CoxET AL., supra note 1, at 654-55.
28 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1217-18.
29 See id. at 1218-20; Anne Schwimmer, Drexel Diaspora: The People Who Drove the
Juggernaut, One Year Later, INvEsTmENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 11, 1991 (the junk bond
market has been "traditionally thin").
3 0 See, e.g., Ockermaan v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158-60 (6th Cir. 1994)
(fraud on the market presumption does not apply when market for a securities issue is not
1996]
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Where the securities laws are designed to provide someone buying claims
against or interests in an entity with information on the way in which the
business operates-and throws off income-based on its initial and ongoing
relationships, bankruptcy produces fundamental alterations in those
relationships. The greater the probability that bankruptcy will not simply end
the relationships, but change them in an ongoing way, the greater the problem
for securities disclosure.
Simple financially-oriented disclosure that treats bankruptcy as a mere end-
point does not satisfactorily address this new complexity of insolvency risk.
Workout and reorganization dynamics reflect attempts to restructure the
debtor's obligations in ways that will permit it to continue operating its
business. Ideally, this will create advantages for creditors as well as
management and equity holders, because it will preserve the going concern
value of corporate property instead of disposing of it at fire sale prices. 31
Unlike liquidation, the negotiated restructuring process, in or out of
bankruptcy, alters the rights for which security holders originally bargained in
important and nonuniform ways.
How a given class of security holders will fare in a workout or
reorganization depends to a considerable degree on how effectively it can
overcome collective action problems that obstruct class members' participation
in negotiating the restructuring. Collective action problems are the factors that
make it difficult for groups containing more than a few members to act on
matters of common interest to them, absent coercion or special organizational
devices to enable them to act together. The larger the group, the more it will
fail to optimize the value of rights belonging to the group in common. This is
true even though all members of the group are both rational and self-interested.
The phenomenon occurs because, inter alia, each member of a large group will
stand to gain only a small portion of a common good if it is obtained. Because
the costs of seeking the common good may be substantial and individual group
members will prefer to avoid paying their share if they can, the costs and risks
imposed on a few members if they act to seek the common good will tend to
outweigh what they stand to gain on success. Weighing their own costs and
risks against their potential share of the common good, rational group members
will not act, and the group as a whole will forego the common good. 32
efficient, as in the case of a new issue); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193,
197-99 (6th Cir. 1990) (the market for newly-issued municipal bonds is not efficient);
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N. J. 1989).
31 See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BusINEss REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY
3-4 (1996).
32 See MANcuR OLSON, JR., THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE AcION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 9-12, 14-16, 21, passim (1965).
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In the context of workouts and reorganizations, a central collective action
problem is that if there are many creditors in a particular class whose claims on
average are relatively small, they will have difficulty retaining common
representation unless they can agree on a mechanism for sharing the heavy
costs of legal action across the entire group. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code33 provides a statutory mechanism to deal with this problem in the
reorganization context: the appointment of creditors' committees, whose
members are compensated out of the bankruptcy estate. 34 The committee
system does not always work well, because of factors such as conflicts among
creditors appointed to committee membership, but it is still superior to the
absence of any such mechanism for nonbankruptcy workouts.35
The collective action problems imperfectly dealt with by the committee
system create difficulties both for investors and for the fairness of the
bankruptcy process itself. Important elements in the Chapter 11 statutory
scheme of reorganization give debtor management not only the right to
continue managing a reorganizing entity, 36 but important rights such as an
exclusive period during which only management may formulate and present a
plan of reorganization. 37 This gives management initiative in the reorganization
process that may potentially be used to the disadvantage of security holders,
and especially the holders of unsecured debt. This magnifies the collective
action problems that security holders face in negotiating with management.
While some commentators have reacted to the imbalance between management
and creditors by proposing simply to do away with Chapter 11, 3 8 experience
33 Codified as Title 11, U.S.C.
34 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 328(a), 330, 1102, 1103 (1994).
35 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LMIrs OF BANKRupTCY LAW 8-19
(1986); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,
680-81 (1993); Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy
and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERs L. REv. 1211, 1222, 1237-
45, 1290 (1994).
36 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107, 1108 (1994).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994).
38 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 35, at 218-24 (1986); Barry E. Adler, Financial and
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 344-45
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 138-40 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.i. 1043 (1992); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. Rnv. 471, 473 (1994). But
see, Lynn M. LoPucld, Strange Vsions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley
and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for
Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
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suggests that this would not only result in unnecessary liquidations, but might
in fact result in even greater disparity of treatment between larger and smaller
creditors. Better-informed security holders will be better positioned to take
advantage of rights already present, at least in the letter of the Bankruptcy
Code, in order to secure more equitable treatment.
B. Bankruptcy Loses Its Innocence
To understand the kinds of bankruptcy risk that must be considered for
disclosure under the securities laws, one must understand the ways in which the
bankruptcy process may affect the interests of security holders. Originally-and
in the model on which traditional securities law disclosure of bankruptcy risk
was based-this was not terribly complicated; it followed the pattern still seen
in Chapter 7 liquidations. An insolvent corporation that filed a bankruptcy
petition was taken over by a trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee then sold its
assets as expeditiously as possible, and finally distributed the proceeds to those
with claims against the debtor according to a schedule of priorities established
primarily by prebankruptcy contracts between the debtor and the claimants
against it.39
This simple liquidation model provided the exclusive insolvency relief
under the Bankruptcy Act (the "former Act") as originally enacted in 1898.40
During the Great Depression, Congress added reorganization provisions to the
former Act, 41 but these were not frequently used for large corporations with
publicly held securities. The primary reason for this was that under the former
39 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (1994); STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CREDrroRs' REmEs
AND DEBTORS' PROTECrIoN 864-65 (4th ed. 1987); Mendales, supra note 35, at 1253-55;
see also Henry J. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48
HARV. L. REv. 39, 46-48 (1934).
40 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2590 (1978).
41 Before 1933, reorganizations existed, but were conducted as equity receiverships
under nonbankruptcy law. Reorganization was gradually taken under the wing of the former
Act during the Depression, beginning with section 77, 47 Stat. 1474-82 (1933), and
providing for railroad reorganization; section 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (1934), providing for
reorganizations of certain nonrailroad businesses; and the Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-
696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (formerly codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and repealed
in 1978), which superseded section 77B and formally added Chapters X and XI to the
former Act as its provisions for reorganizing enterprises other than railroads. See generally,
James Angell McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.
Cln. L. REV. 369 (1937); Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of
Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE LJ. 1334
(1939).
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Act, cases involving the reorganization of publicly held corporations took place
mostly within the rigid framework of former Chapter X, with management
superseded by a trustee and mandatory supervision by the SEC to protect
public investors.
The cumbersome nature of former Chapter X, and its displacement of
management, made it a last resort. It was rarely used in the years after the
Great Depression, except for a few very large cases. 42 While vagueness in the
former Act led to some use of former Chapter XI to reorganize publicly held
corporations, cases of this sort involving corporations in or near the Fortune
500 size range were not at all routine during the period between the Great
Depression and the launch of the Bankruptcy Code in 1979. 43
This was changed substantially by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,44
whose principal part, known to its devotees as the "Bankruptcy Code," has
superseded the former Act as the statute governing federal bankruptcy.
Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code has transformed
bankruptcy into a more complex process than its traditional role as a means for
winding up failed businesses, or even as a haven for the financially distressed.
This transformation carries with it the risk that public security holders will
become involved in issuer bankruptcies more frequently and in less cut-and-
dried ways. The changes not only raise problems with the established
framework of disclosure, but raise substantial questions as to the completeness
of the disclosure model now established for securities regulation.
Moreover, reorganizations, though they have varied in frequency with the
business cycle, have increased in frequency and become an important and
enduring part of the legal landscape. No business can be described as
bankruptcy-proof-neither a small business nor a "Fortune 500" corporation.
Even more significant for considerations of securities law disclosure, the
proliferation of complex new types of securities and the evolving dynamics of
reorganization mean that the consequences of bankruptcy are not just that one's
capital will softly and suddenly vanish away, but that it will be changed in
strange and wonderful ways that may be subject to considerable
manipulation.45
Securities law has been further pushed toward consideration of bankruptcy
as ever smaller companies turn to securities markets, rather than institutional
4 2 See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKE. LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, at 246-47 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 35, at 676.
43 See CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 42, at 246-48, 261 n.31.
44 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
45 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPuckl, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV.
729, 732-38; Mendales, supra note 35, at 1276-97.
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lenders, to raise capital. The growth of the junk bond market during the
1980s 46 both expanded the number of securities issuers, and, by increasing
their leverage, increased their susceptibility to bankruptcy. 47 The trend toward
using the securities markets for raising capital that would traditionally have
been obtained from institutional lenders promises to continue and expand, 48
bringing a new stratum of securities issuers into the markets. 49
Bankruptcy risks are also increasing because bankruptcy is more likely to
be employed in situations where, in the past, a debtor corporation would have
resisted its use. With management not displaced by the reorganization process
and the stigma of bankruptcy gone, Chapter 11 becomes a powerful tactic-and
bargaining chip-in the general arsenal of corporate litigation. This means,
inter alia, that in situations where financially distressed businesses might
previously have tried to work out their problems with creditors short of
bankruptcy, Chapter 11 reorganization offers important incentives to force
creditor negotiations into bankruptcy court. This is further aggravated by the
Bankruptcy Code's endorsement of a procedure not previously available to
46 Original issue junk bonds (as opposed to "fallen angels" that lost investment-grade
ratings as their issuers fell on hard times) have only become common since 1977. See, e.g.,
Paul Asquith et al., Original Issue High ield Bonds: Aging Analyses of Defaults,
Exchanges, and Ca//s, 44 J. FIN. 923, 926 (1989); Robert A. Taggart, Jr., 71w Growth of
the "Junk Bond" Market and Its Role in Financing Takeovers, in MERGERs AND
AcQuismoNs 5, 8 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
4 7 See, e.g., PAUL. ASQUrrH ET AL., ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL DIsTREss: AN
EXAMINATION OF JUNK-BOND ISSUERS 24-26 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 3942, 1991) (both theoretical and empirical findings suggest that more
complex debt structure-apart from degree of leverage-makes companies more prone to
bankruptcy); ALAN C. SHAPIRO, MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE, 458-60 (1990); Coffee &
Klein, supra note 3, at 1207; Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A 77teory of Workouts
and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991); Robert J. McCartney, Role
Reversal for Wall Street's Debt Builders, WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1990, at H1; Anne
Schwimmer, Hard Truths About the Restructuring Business, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Nov. 26, 1990, at 18.
48 In fact, structured finance techniques such as assembling pools of receivables into
transferable packages have become sufficiently pervasive that they are now being used in
the transfer of obligations between institutions, with instruments on the margins of being
classified as securities. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Co. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1538-40
(10th Cir. 1993) (packages of auto loan receivables sold to financial institutions held not to
be securities for purposes of 1933 Act).
49 See Lawrence Zuckerman, Secretive Property Enpires Made Public by Stock Sales,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at Al (real estate operations traditionally run as private family-
held corporations increasingly turning to public equity markets, exposing them to securities
disclosure rules).
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publicly held corporations:50 the "prepackaged" Chapter 11,51 which combines
some of the advantages of workouts, notably avoidance of many of the
transaction costs and delays of a Chapter 11 reorganization, with Chapter 11
advantages such as the ability to force minority creditors to accept a debt
restructuring.5 2 The prepackaged Chapter 11 has increasingly become a fact of
life that securities holders must face in situations where nonbankruptcy
restructuring would have been the most likely means of first aid for the
financially disabled. 53
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy has lost both its
stigma and most of the features that made former Chapter X unattractive to
corporate management. Its use in reorganizing large, publicly held corporations
has consequently become substantially more frequent.54 While it is supposed to
create a forum in which the debtor corporation and its creditors can
compromise claims in ways satisfactory to both, it may give management
opportunities for manipulation that are not only disadvantageous to creditors
generally, but which may create special risks for small and diverse creditors
such as security holders. This is true not only after commencement of the
bankruptcy process, but also as it looms in the background, because a debtor
corporation need not even prove technical insolvency before availing itself of
the Chapter 11 process. 55 Its management thus not only has substantial control
in reorganization, but has enormous discretion to decide if and when to file a
petition, giving it major leverage in dealing with creditors in workout situations
prior to bankruptcy.
Under present Chapter 11, unlike former Chapter X, a corporation's
management normally remains in control as "debtor in possession" ("DIP")
5 0 This procedure, prepackaging, developed as an informal practice under Chapter XI
of the former Act; but former Chapter XI, unlike Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, was
intended for use by privately held debtors. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 410 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.
51 See In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)
(prepackaged bankruptcy case); Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1209-10; Mendales,
supra note 35, at 1219-20, 1282-86.
52 See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1209-10.
5 4 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 35, at 675.
55 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1994); United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 71 (1994). There is a court-made doctrine allowing a
bankruptcy court to dismiss a petition filed in bad faith, but it is rarely invoked except
where bankruptcy is used solely as a delaying tactic in single-asset cases, and will not
usually succeed against a debtor that, while possibly solvent, has genuine cash-flow
problems or other financial distress.
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during a reorganization. 56 It is the only party that normally has the right, over
the first 120 days of the case, to propose a plan of reorganization, 57 and it has
the initiative with respect to all transactions that the debtor engages in during
reorganization, though the court must normally approve those transactions
outside the ordinary course of business.58
Securities holders, as creditors or interest holders, have important rights in
this process, both with respect to the course that it follows and its conclusion.
The most important of these include the rights to form committees to negotiate
with management,5 9 to offer legal objections to actions proposed by
management, and to vote for or against proposed plans of reorganization. 60 For
too many security holders, however, collective action problems-chiefly the
costs of obtaining information and acting together on such information-
preclude them from effectively exercising these rights.
The net result of the complexities of the Chapter 11 bargaining process is
that, although the absolute priority rule for distribution of the debtor's assets
nominally governs in the same way as in classic liquidations, there are in fact
substantial deviations in actual distributions. 61 Unsecured creditors often
receive less than they would if the absolute priority rule were strictly applied,
with stockholders receiving distributions that would be barred by the rule.62
Even more important, the share that any class of creditors (or, for that matter,
shareholders) will receive in a plan of reorganization depends to some degree
on the success of that class in overcoming its collective action problems to
obtain vigorous representation in the bargaining that goes into formulating and
confirming a plan of reorganization. 63
III. POssiBLE SUBSnTuTEs FOR MANDATORY DIscLOSURE
Mandatory disclosure, particularly under the SEC's formal registration
requirements, can be a blunt instrument. It tends to be inflexible and slow to
56 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1107 (1994). The court may order the displacement of
management by a Chapter 11 trustee, but this is unusual, and requires a showing of serious
misconduct such as fraud or "gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor." See 11
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
57 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a), (b) (1994).
58 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1107(a), 1108 (1994).
59 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-03 (1994).
60 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1994).
61 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
125, 141-43 (1990).
62 See id. at 141-43, 149, 165-66, passim.
63 See, e.g., id. at 161-64; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 35, at 737, 745-47.
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adapt to change, including new kinds of issues. Moreover, it imposes
significant costs upon an issuer, including SEC registration charges, fees to
highly paid professionals, and, in the transactional process, costs imposed by
delay inherent in the registration process. 64 These costs may be particularly
onerous in the context of bankruptcy-related disclosure, since this disclosure
will be particularly important for financially weak issuers. 65 It is thus
important, before imposing new disclosure duties, to consider whether adequate
substitutes are available at materially less cost.
The question of dealing with bankruptcy disclosure does not resolve itself
into a simple dichotomy between fully mandatory disclosure and a total absence
thereof. Rather, it is worth considering various forms of direct and indirect
voluntary disclosure as potential alternatives to mandatory disclosure.
Voluntary disclosure, it might be argued, is most suitable to the needs of the
market. It will be flexible, fitting the needs of a particular set of issuers,
security holders, and potential holders better than the blunt instrument of
mandatory disclosure. A close examination of voluntary disclosure, however,
reveals that it can be effective only insofar as it supplements a more general
regime of mandatory disclosure.
A. Direct Voluntary Disclosure
One of the most obvious alternatives to mandatory disclosure is voluntary
disclosure by the issuer or its underwriters, along lines roughly parallel to
those now followed by the mandatory disclosure system, but more closely
tailored to the needs of particular issuers and their markets. Some critics of
mandatory disclosure have argued that market forces-chiefly acting through
underwriters whose reputation depends on their reputation for reliably
disclosing information on the securities they sell-will push issuers into this
kind of full and fair disclosure, without the need for the prolonged bureaucratic
exchanges required by federal securities law.66
Even if one disputes the idea that voluntary disclosure (by itself or in
combination with the indirect forms of disclosure described below) should
generally supplant mandatory disclosure, one can argue that, given the costs of
each incremental datum of mandatory disclosure, the special kinds of disclosure
6 4 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 707 (1984).
65 See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
6 6 See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 167-69
(1966); Easterbrook & Fisohel, supra note 64, at 673-77; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
19, at 618-21; George Stigler, Public Regulation ofthe Securities Market, 37 J. Bus. 117,
124 (1964).
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dealing with the burgeoning complications of Chapter 11 are best dealt with in
this fashion. Advocates of this position can point to the assistance given by
underwriters to issuers that have encountered difficulty after their securities
were marketed, in working out their problems short of actual bankruptcy. One
of the primary motivations of the underwriters in so acting has been to protect
their reputations, which could be damaged by their sale of securities that
entangled their holders in bankruptcy. 67
There are, however, serious problems with this position. Underwriters' aid
to issuers that have encountered post-issue difficulties tends to underline, rather
than undo, insufficient explanation of risk in initial disclosure to investors. In
fact, the exchange offers aided by underwriters in this context have often been
prejudicial to investors, pushing them toward agreeing to exchange offers more
disadvantageous to them than bankruptcy. 68 More fundamentally, the incentives
to issuers and underwriters to voluntarily disclose bankruptcy risks in advance
of real financial trouble tend to be outweighed by incentives to do the reverse,
particularly costs and pressure to sell securities during brief windows of
opportunity in volatile markets. 69 The short time horizons of such transactions
tend to push participants to apply high discount factors to risks, particularly if
the risks are as intangible as damage to reputation.
B. Indirect Forms of Voluntary Disclosure
Indirect forms of voluntary disclosure exist in several forms, which, singly
and in combination, can both help in the transmission of voluntary disclosure to
the market and can also serve as independent sources of information on
securities issuers. Moreover, the indirect forms can enhance, or detract from,
investor confidence in voluntary disclosure by providing at least somewhat
independent checks on its accuracy. The most widely used of these sources is
the rating system.
1. Ratings and How They Work
An even more important possible substitute for mandatory disclosure is the
rating system. 70 Ratings, at first glance, appear to be a particularly plausible
67 See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 74-77 (1989); Mendales, supra note
35, at 1271; see also, In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 1211, 1213 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1991) (underwriter acted as financial adviser to issuer on restructuring its debt); Asquith et
al., supra note 46, at 933-34; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 620-21.
68 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1212-13.
69 See, e.g., Banoff, supra note 19, at 149.
70 See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 814 F. Supp. 850, 864
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substitute for mandatory disclosure, because they are already so used for
certain kinds of securities, including short-term corporate debt in the form of
commercial paper.71
Securities ratings are formulated privately, although they have increasingly
been incorporated in certain aspects of regulatory law,72 especially statutes
concerning asset-backed securities such as the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984.73 A few rating firms, dominated by Standard &
Poor's and Moody's, 74 set standards, investigate issuers, evaluate their
offerings, and publish the resulting ratings. 75 Both issuers and their securities
are rated; different securities issued by the same issuer will carry different
ratings according to the rater's judgment of their ability to fulfill their
contractual promises to holders. Moreover, issuers and their securities are often
rated by more than one agency at a time, sometimes with inconsistent results. 76
2. Why Ratings Are Imperfect Substitutes for Disclosure
Ratings, while a useful adjunct to disclosure, cannot adequately substitute
for it on most bankruptcy issues. There are several reasons for this. Rating
agencies are primarily concerned with the risk of default itself, rather than the
complications that attend reorganization. 77 They are not well prepared to
inform investors of the risks and rights involved in a workout or Chapter 11
case.
Even more basically, the rating process itself depends on the adequacy of
mandatory disclosure in ways that could not easily be replaced by privately
agreed upon contractual duties.78 Insofar as this is the case, ratings are one of
the means by which disclosure is communicated to the markets, rather than a
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (rating of securities at junk bond level made it difficult for plaintiffs to
show prospectus misled market), affid in pertinent part, 35 F.3d 1407, 1428 (9th Cir.
1994); Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating
Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEO L. REv. 579
(1993).
71 See JENNINGS Er AL., supra note 1, at 6-7.
72 See, e.g., Rating the Rating Agencies, THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 1995, at 53-54.
73 Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and
15 U.S.C. (1994)).
74 See Gregory Husisian, Note, Wiat Standard of Care Should Govern the World's
Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REv.
411,421 (1990); Rating the Rating Agencies, supra note 72, at 53.
75 See, e.g., SHAPmO, supra note 47, at 612-16.
76 See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 74, at 411.
77 See, e.g., id. at 412-13.
78 See, e.g., id. at 412 n.7.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
substitute for securities law disclosure. 79
The rating process, moreover, insulates the market from important issuer
information in ways that do not apply to parties charged with specific
mandatory disclosure duties. A basic problem is analogous to the reduction in
fidelity that occurs when one copies a prior recording: each successive
generation of recordings is less faithful to the original than its predecessor. The
rating process, in being conducted by persons who owe no legally recognized
duties to the issuer, and who work chiefly with secondary sources of
information, without a norm of making independent investigations, risks this
problem.80
Ratings tend to aggregate data in ways that tend to preclude the
transmission of important information on the special bankruptcy risks inherent
in certain types of instruments or their issuers. Rating agencies rate large
numbers of different issues and cannot study any particular one with the depth
that those charged with specific disclosure duties can. A particular rating
indicates that, in the rater's opinion, a security falls within a particular band of
risk.81 It cannot, inter alia, provide the kind of issuer-specific information to
holders that may help them to overcome collective action problems in the
reorganization process.
Additionally, the rating system does not provide the kind of potential
liability that creates adequate incentives for the kind of full disclosure that the
securities laws demand. Rating agencies make exceedingly difficult targets for
bankruptcy-affected security holders.82 The agencies, and their attorneys, have
neither due diligence obligations under the 1933 Act, nor assigned duties for
continuing reporting under the 1934 Act. It is even questionable whether,
under most circumstances, they owe the kind of fiduciary duties to issuers that
would impose upon them the duty to disclose issuer information or refrain from
trading on such information under the 1934 Act. 83 Absent these duties, it is
difficult to impose securities law liability on them at all, given the stringent
scienter requirements for liability under the antifraud provisions of the 1934
Act.84 Moreover, given that the agencies are primarily processors rather than
79 The rating agencies themselves are concerned by this, and are disquieted by
movement, in other countries as well as the United States, toward making their ratings a
substitute for mandatory disclosure. See Rating the Rating Agencies, supra note 72, at 53.80 See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 74, at 422-24, 437-38.
81 See, e.g., id. at 454-55; Rating the Rating Agencies, supra note 72, at 54.
82 See, e.g., Husisian, supra, note 74, at 413-14, 424 n.56, 427, 442-44.
83 See Chiarella v. SEC, 445 U.S. 222, 229, 231-35 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 656-59, 662 n.22 (1983).
84 See, e.g., In re Towers Financial Corp. Noteholders Litigation, 1996 WL 393579,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d
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providers of information, the costs of imputing new liabilities to them appear to
exceed the benefits.
Some recent developments have begun to change this, and the changes
could lead to changes in this analysis. The rating agencies have increasingly
become direct participants in the process of securities registration by the
regulators and legislation concerning securities regulation. Initially, this
process, at the regulatory level, absolved the issuers of securities with
investment-grade ratings from some disclosure requirements. 85  This
development has perhaps gone furthest in the disclosure process for mortgage-
backed securities, the oldest and still best-developed class of asset-backed
securities discussed in this Article.8 6 The Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act,87 by making certain legal entitlements for mortgage-backed
securities contingent upon their being rated in one of the two highest categories
by at least one nationally recognized rating organization, 88 began the process of
statutory recognition for a direct rating agency role in the disclosure process.
The rating agencies, meanwhile, have made an important change in their
status which makes them look more like other professionals with legally
recognized roles in the process of securities issuance and less like independent
journalists: they have begun to collect fees from issuers for rating particular
securities issues.89 All of this could conceivably create a specific enough duty
on the part of the rating agencies to make them more vulnerable than in their
more traditional role as a purely private analytical service without direct
involvement in the process of regulated disclosure. Generally, however, the
traditional difficulty of recovery from rating agencies, and the increasing
resistance of both Congress and the courts to extend securities law liability to
new parties, 90 will effectively insulate them from the pressure for completeness
and accuracy that would make their work effective substitutes for mandatory
disclosure.
175 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying general standards of liability for common law fraud); Pittman
v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La.) (same), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1987).
85 See 17 C.F.R. § 230 (1993); Rating the Rating Agencies, supra note 72, at 53.
86 See infra notes 188-224 and accompanying text.
87 Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and
15 U.S.C. (1994)).
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (1994).
89 See Rating the Rating Agencies, supra note 72, at 54; Husisian, supra note 74, at
433.
90 See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1447-48 (1994) (striking down aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5).
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C. Other Substitutes for Mandatory Disclosure
Although the rating mechanism is by far the most important third-party
substitute for mandatory securities law disclosure in current use, other
substitutes exist whose use might in theory be extended to take up more of the
role otherwise played by mandatory disclosure.
1. The Financial Press
The financial press has always played a major role in transmitting
corporate information to the public. It did so before public securities regulation
was instituted and even before formal private rating systems were introduced,
and it now helps to transmit ratings to the investing public. 91 One may
therefore ask whether, in combination with the rating process and aided by
modem technology, it might be an efficient, market-based channel for
disclosure of newly important kinds of information-such as insolvency-
oriented material-in a more efficient way than the blunt instrument of
mandatory disclosure.
To some degree, the financial press already plays a limited role in
bankruptcy disclosure. A frequent reader will become broadly familiar with the
mechanics of reorganization, with the financial difficulties affecting particular
corporations, and with important developments such as the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.
For more specific information, however, the financial press suffers from
most of the same infirmities as rating agencies when viewed as a substitute for
disclosure. Like the agencies, it is primarily a processor rather than an
originator of information. It has even less incentive to cover small issuers and
has limitations of space to which the rating agencies are not subject. Like the
agencies, it has no legal duties in terms of coverage and, given First
Amendment considerations, it may be even more difficult to impose liabilities
upon it for error, absent deliberate fraud. 92
2. Professional Analysts
Professional analysts complement rating agencies and the financial press in
91 See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 74, at 416 n.27; Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1352-
53.
92 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1345, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(analysis of securities disclosure is important function of a free financial press and
entitled to First Amendment protection in libel action).
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obtaining information on securities and their issuers and processing it for
dissemination to the investing public. 93 They play a substantial role in
integrating disclosed information with other information relevant to the status
of issuers and their securities and in conveying all of this information to the
markets.94
Professional analysts, however, are largely an adjunct to disclosure rather
than a substitute for it. Their work relies upon mandatory disclosure and would
be more difficult and subject to greater uncertainty in its absence. Furthermore,
since they are usually employed by securities firms who depend heavily on
underwriting business from issuers, they are subject to heavy pressures from
the companies that they follow to weight their analyses favorably, at least to the
extent of avoiding negative recommendations. 95 Insolvency-related analysis
becomes particularly difficult given these pressures, and the problem becomes
still worse in the absence of the safeguards provided by mandatory disclosure.
Even if one disregards these limitations, analysts would still be far from an
adequate substitute for mandatory disclosure, because analysts tend to follow
only a comparatively small fraction of the issuers with publicly held
securities. 96 This fraction has tended to shrink in recent years, and the added
difficulties of obtaining information in a world without mandatory disclosure
could be expected to reduce it further still.
3. Insiders and Other Traders
Trading, and particularly insider transactions, furnish another potential
source of information, because the prices at which insiders and other traders
with access to their information trade will serve to transmit at least some of
their knowledge to the more general market. 97 Transactions of this kind may
thus provide important clues to the risks underlying the securities being traded
by insiders. 98 Even with current restrictions on insider trading in equity
93 See, e.g., Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1339 (Sept. 2,
1980); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 569; Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1354.
94 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983); Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Note,
Rude 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure to Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. Rv.
1517, 1519-20 (1992).
95 See Michael Siconolfi, Many Companies Press Analysts to Steer Cear of Negative
Ratings, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at Al.
96 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 730-32 (1984).
97 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 572; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
64, at 681.
98 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 689; see generally MANNE, supra note
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securities, insider transactions provide significant clues to corporate events. It
has been argued that removing the restrictions on insider trading would in fact
provide useful information and thus improve the efficiency of the securities
markets. The question is even more complex for corporate debt, because
liability has not yet been imposed for insider trading in debt. Strong arguments
have been made for doing so, however, and it appears that the law may be
moving in that direction. 99
Insider transactions do provide some information on the overall condition
of an issuer and on what persons who presumably have the most information
believe to be appropriate prices for certain securities. Insiders, however, may
have motives for trading other than immediate direct profit-motives that may
be in direct conflict with those of other investors-and the prices they are
willing to give or take on securities aggregate information even more
impenetrably than ratings. Moreover, transactions in corporate debt which, as
we shall see, pose more disclosure problems than those in equity, are especially
problematic because the markets for debt are much thinner and their prices less
transparent than those in the equity markets. 100
IV. DiscLosunR IssuES: BEFORB BANKRUPTCY IS IMMINENT
Given the incompleteness of potential substitutes, it appears that mandatory
disclosure is needed for at least some bankruptcy-related information. One must
next consider when and to what extent this kind of disclosure should be
required. This will vary from situation to situation, to maximize the cost-
effectiveness of disclosure.
The first category that needs to be considered consists of initial securities
offerings by businesses that are not in immediate financial danger. Even here, it
is possible that careful consideration of insolvency-related issues will indicate
that bankruptcy-oriented disclosure is appropriate. The best time to consider
appropriate disclosure is while the form and structure of a new security are
being established. In most cases, this is well before the issuer must actually
consider filing a bankruptcy petition.10 1 While this kind of consideration may
66.
99 See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 835; 8 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3598-3602 (3d ed, 1991); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 92, 113-15; Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two
Instruments: Insider Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187, 212-58
(1993).
100 See, e.g., JENNiNGS ETrAL., supra note 1, at 11; Banoff, supra note 19, at 151.
101 However, this is not necessarily true. Securities issued pursuant to transactions
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show no particular need for special insolvency-related disclosure, the mere
process of considering the issues-and, perhaps, at least a perfunctory check
with bankruptcy-experienced counsel-may lead to detection and circumvention
of problems that could otherwise lead to major problems later. 102
Ironically, the standards for disclosure accompanying the issuance of
securities outside of bankruptcy are substantially more rigorous than those
arising from the issuance of securities pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization. The former securities are subject to full securities law
disclosure requirements, while the latter are protected by the "safe harbor" 0 3
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 04 and therefore require approval only by
the bankruptcy court under the less exacting disclosure rules of the Bankruptcy
Code itself.105
A. How Much Disclosure of Bankruptcy Issues Should the Securities
Laws Require?
The goal of making any new disclosure requirements cost-effective implies
that the first question to consider for any given security is whether the
bankruptcy process itself creates special risks to its holders, beyond the general
risk of nonpayment that traditional financial disclosure contemplates. To the
extent that special risks of this kind are present, we must also consider the
difficulty of reporting them with sufficient precision to be meaningful to
investors and the securities markets, and the degree to which the benefits of
examining and describing them would exceed the benefits gained from giving
them a pass.
1. General Principles: Hard or Soft Infonnation?
The securities laws require an issuer to make complete and accurate
disclosure of material information of concern to purchasers of its securities.106
There is no question that this duty applies to "hard" information, Le.,
objectively verifiable information concerning a security such as the rights that it
such as leveraged buyouts or workouts may well be issued in contemplation of bankruptcy
within the near future.
102 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 699.
103 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 229 (1977).
104 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(e), 1145 (1994).
105 See Mendales, supra note 35, at 1276-82.
106 See section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934), and Rule lob-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.lOb-5 (1996); Nielsen v. Greenwood, 849 F. Supp. 1233, 1241 (N.D. M11. 994).
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gives its holder against the issuer and holders of competing securities; objective
information concerning the issuer's business such as its lines of business,
lawsuits by and against it; and accounting data concerning its assets, debts,
profits, losses, and other indicia of past performance. 10 7 The duty does not,
however, require the disclosure of all information concerning a particular
security, even at the time the security is issued. The courts, in fact, have been
concerned lest issuers overwhelm investors with "an avalanche of trivial
information." 08
Concern on the part of regulators and the courts that certain nondeceptive
information should not be disclosed is not limited to trivia. A far more difficult
issue concerns "soft" information, i.e., information subject to a substantial
degree of uncertainty, particularly opinions and forward-looking information
such as financial projections. 10 9 Soft information poses uniquely difficult
disclosure problems because the very uncertainty that distinguishes it from hard
information makes it difficult, and often undesirable, to impose liability if the
projections fail to materialize. 110 Moreover, since the uncertainty makes it
more difficult for noninsiders to evaluate and more subject to manipulation by
insiders, its disclosure may be as deceptive as its omission.I
107 See Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings
Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information, 46 MD. L. REv. 1114, 1116-17
(1987).
108 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)).
109 See, e.g., 1933 Act, Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996); 1934 Act, Rule 3b-6,
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1996); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083,
1093-94 (1991); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 775 (3d Cir. 1985); Cox ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 75-76; John C. Coffee, Jr., Companies' Projections Pose Problems, NAT'L
L.J. Feb. 8, 1993, at 22; Jonathan Eisenberg, Enforcement Issues and Litigation: Liability
for Faulty Earnings Projections and Optimistic Statements, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 202 (1993);
Joseph A. Grundfest, Disinzplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1003, 1012, 1016 (1994);
Homer Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293,
314-16 (1975); A. Ann Fruman, Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under
the Securities Laws, 88 YALE L.J. 338 (1978).
110 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232 (where impact of an event on a corporation's
future is "contingent or speculative in nature," it is difficult to determine whether omission
of information concerning it is material); see also, Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847
F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir. 1988)) (reasonable investors do not understand projections to be
guarantees of future performance).
I I I Based on these characteristics, the SEC actually opposed disclosure of most soft
information until 1973. See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (5th
Cir. 1993) (there is no duty to disclose an economic forecast, and prospectus projections are
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Securities lawyers, and particularly the SEC, have struggled with soft
information for a long time. Originally, the potentially deceptive nature of
much of this kind of information led the SEC to actually bar its disclosure.
Since the 1970s, however, these views have changed radically, and the SEC's
position has gone from reluctance to tolerance to a new stance in which a great
deal of soft evidence must be disclosed, chiefly in the form of the statement
now formally required under the heading, "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" ("MD & A-). 112
Nonetheless, given the inherent uncertainty of soft information, and the fact
that reasonable investors understand such uncertainty to exist, Congress, the
SEC, and the courts have expressed increasing reluctance to impose liability for
errors in disclosure of this kind, unless actually made in bad faith or with
deceptive intent. 113 The controversial Private Securities Reform Act of 1995114
(the "PSRA") creates a limited safe harbor for forward-looking
pronouncements to the extent that they are accompanied by "meaningful
cautionary statements." 1 15 The SEC's less controversial Rule 175116
anticipated this by providing a safe harbor in the context of 1933 Act
disclosure, although the congressional sponsors of the PSRA expressed doubt
that the rule went far enough in curbing what they considered to be abusive
securities litigation." 7 Moreover, the courts, to some degree anticipating the
PSRA, had already created the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, limiting liability
for forward-looking information: securities fraud will not be found if a
prospectus contains specific information indicating reasons for investor caution,
despite broad optimism by management.Is
not generally actionable unless worded as guarantees); Cox ET AL., supra note 1, at 82;
Janet E. Kerr, A Walk 77Trough the arcuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Informadon, 46 MD.
L. REv. 1071, 1072-75 (1987).
112 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 109, at 22, 24; Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1349-
50.
113 See Pasternak v. Colonial Equities Corp. (In re Colonial Ltd. Partnership Litig.),
854 F. Supp. 64, 91-92 (D.Conn. 1994); Ciresi v. Citicorp, 782 F. Supp. 819, 822
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 956 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1992).
114 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
115 PSRA section 102, including provisions inserted as section 27A of the 1933 Act,
codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2 (West Supp. 1996); and Securities Exchange Act section
21E of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5 (West Supp. 1996).
116 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996).
1 1 7 See JAMES HAMILTON, PRvATE SECUITIES LrrIGATION REFORM ACr OF 1995:
LAWAND EXPLANATION 16-22 (CCH 1996).
118 See Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assoc., Ltd., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,616 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 1995); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th
Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991); Polin
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Bankruptcy-related disclosure creates special problems under the hard-soft
dichotomy. At first glance, most information concerning the mechanics of an
issuer's potential bankruptcy would appear to be soft, especially if a bankruptcy
filing is not under immediate contemplation. More careful analysis, however,
reveals that information on this subject breaks down into a mixture of hard and
soft data, and even the soft components may be both important to investors and
capable of being reported in a meaningful way.119
The contours of bankruptcy law as they apply to the reorganization of a
particular entity are, for the most part, well-defined, and thus can be said to
constitute hard information. This is true even where the outcome of a particular
bankruptcy case, or of a proceeding within it, may be uncertain. Important
information includes both general facts about reorganization and facts particular
to a given issuer and even to specific outstanding securities. The closer an
issuer actually is to bankruptcy, the "harder" the latter information will be. As
we shall see, 120 the need for particular kinds of disclosure will vary issue by
issue; even hard information appropriate for disclosure in one context-such as
for securities with particular bankruptcy sensitivities-may be inappropriate for
other circumstances, such as an initial offering of common stock by a
financially sound issuer.
2. Tax Disclosure and the Bankruptcy Analogy
Requiring an evaluation of bankruptcy issues for purposes of securities law
disclosure does not involve introducing a radically new kind of disclosure. A
substantial body of law has already grown up concerning the mandatory
disclosure of a similar issue: the tax law characteristics of securities. 121
Disclosure of the tax characteristics of securities has long been required and
provides a useful model for study in formulating policy toward the equally
abstruse risks posed by bankruptcy law, although bankruptcy adds some
v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Worlds of Wonder See.
Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413-15 (9th Cir. 1994). Still, blanket warnings of general risk will
not immunize misrepresentations under the doctrine. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d
160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986);
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in relevant
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); In re Donald Trump Casino
See. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 551-54 (D.NJ. 1992).
119 C. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 549, 562 n.42 (distinguishing "soft"
from "very soft" information).
120 See infra text accompanying notes 130-163.
121 See, e.g., Reg. S-K, Item 405, 17 C.F.R. § 229.405 (1996); Pension & Inv.
Assocs. of Am., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 290533 (Jan. 25, 1977).
[Vol: 57:731
LOOKING UNDER THE ROCK
complexity all its own.
Tax disclosure also consists of disclosure concerning the application of a
dense set of legal rules to a factual situation. Moreover, like bankruptcy
disclosure, it is forward-looking, involves substantial degrees of uncertainty
concerning the legal treatment of certain transactions, and thus includes both
hard and soft information. Experience in formulating appropriate tax disclosure
can thus be helpful in deciding what bankruptcy disclosure is appropriate,
particularly where new types of securities are being issued.
3. Appropriate Disclosure for Bankruptcy Concerns
Bankruptcy disclosure necessarily incorporates both hard and soft
information. In combining the two, the general rule should be that disclosure is
appropriate in any situation in which information available to the issuer raises a
reasonable probability that bankruptcy would materially change the entitlements
of security holders from their contractual entitlements on liquidation. This
disclosure is not limited to a readily predictable sequence of events, as that
rarely exists: what is needed is sufficient disclosure concerning the range of
possible outcomes for the holders of particular gecurities as to materially
improve the ability of holders to properly evaluate their rights in a potential
workout or reorganization. When, as in the initial public offering paradigm on
which most of the securities laws are based, securities are issued in a
nonworkout situation and the securities lack any special sensitivity to
bankruptcy, the disclosure of a full panoply of bankruptcy options may not add
materially to the ability of potential holders to evaluate their rights, and would
therefore be inappropriate.
In other situations, disclosure of bankruptcy-related information, going
beyond simple data concerning financial weakness, will be not only feasible but
necessary. These situations include those in which the issuer's ability to
continue in business without major financial adjustments is questionable, those
involving a transaction or transactions that could be subject to attack in the
event of the issuer's insolvency, and those in which the securities issued may
have structural sensitivity to bankruptcy. In the first category, issuers may be
weakened based on business conditions or their own financial structure. Here,
mere disclosure of financial weakness may be insufficient if a corporate
management is considering financial restructuring, in or out of bankruptcy,
which would be likely to change the position of the security holders with
respect to the corporation or the holders of other claims against it.
The second category includes securities issued on less than a clean slate.
The securities may have been issued pursuant to a transaction, such as an LBO,
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that would raise questions on the issuer's bankruptcy.' 22 The securities may
have had no direct connection with a transaction of that kind, but the issuer
may previously have engaged in such transactions, raising questions about its
securities, or the issuer may be contemplating a transaction that would create
problems for its security holders.
Bankruptcy disclosure may also be needed because of the way in which the
securities themselves are structured. This is true even if the securities are issued
with high investment-grade ratings, if the high ratings are based not on the
underlying financial strength of the issuer (or, in the case of structured finance
instruments, the parent of the entity for whose ultimate benefit the securities are
being issued) but on a structure designed to protect the security holders from
the beneficial issuer's bankruptcy. 123 If securities are sold on the premise that
they offer buyers a high degree of safety, it is important to disclose aspects of
the underlying structure that may be challenged in bankruptcy. Disclosure of
this kind should deal not only with well-established principles of bankruptcy
law but, in the case of novel structures, with indeterminacy-i.e., that a given
structure does not enjoy the imprimatur of the Bankruptcy Code and has not yet
been tested at the appellate level in a bankruptcy case.
Apart from disclosure specific to a particular issue or issuer, bankruptcy
disclosure, where reorganization is a real possibility, should inform investors
of certain basic mechanics of the reorganization process that will enable them
better to understand their risks and rights therein. The general facts that would
be important include a general description of the reorganization process, and
particularly the role that creditors-including securities holders-play in
negotiating a plan of reorganization. The committee system is particularly
important here including, for junior securities, the right to ask the bankruptcy
court to approve the organization of official, estate-supported committees for
holders of securities with interests opposed to those of a general creditors'
committee.1 24 Equity committees are most common in this category, but courts
also have approved committees for creditors with special interests, such as
subordinated debt. New forms of securities with special bankruptcy sensitivity
(e.g., asset-backed securities) are likely to fall into the latter category.
It will also generally be appropriate to provide at least a general description
of the system by which claimants are called upon to approve a plan of
reorganization. While this is important both in prebankruptcy and
postbankruptcy reorganization maneuvering, the Bankruptcy Code, in its
122 Leveraged buyouts may lead to bankruptcy challenges against subsequently issued
debt securities under provisions such as Bankruptcy Code section 548, 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1994). See infra text accompanying notes 145-57.
123 See infra text accompanying notes 188-213.
124 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994).
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paradigmatic neglect of the holders of securities in large corporate entities,
largely fails to consider their interests in this context. In fairness, the
Bankruptcy Code could hardly be expected to provide for disclosure in the
course of a prepetition workout, since its provisions cannot be invoked until a
petition is actually filed. Nonetheless, provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that
necessarily cast a shadow on the workout process, such as the Bankruptcy
Code's requirement that a plan of reorganization be approved by each class of
creditors, 125 are material information to security holders confronted with a
prebankruptcy exchange offer, and it is therefore appropriate to require their
discussion in securities law disclosure.
The Bankruptcy Code can be more fairly charged with deficiency as it
governs the informational position of securities holders after the issuer files a
reorganization petition. Here, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide for direct
substantial disclosure (other than notification to creditors on when they must
file claims) until late in the process when a plan has already been negotiated
and is being submitted to creditors and interest holders for approval. 126 This
reduces the ability of all but the largest securities holders to organize
committees other than the main creditors' committee, 127 to monitor the
activities of committee members who nominally represent them, 128 and to
exercise their rights as parties in interest to object to transactions proposed by
the DIP that would affect their interests. 129
B. Bankruptcy, the Securities Laws, and Equity Securities
The first set of disclosure issues arising at the interface between the
Bankruptcy Code and the securities laws concerns the appropriate disclosure of
bankruptcy risks under the securities laws at the time of a securities offering
made before the issuer has had to face cash-flow problems or other difficulties
125 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129(a)(7)-(8) (1994) (approval of claims by a class of
creditors requires approval by more than half the voting members of the class holding at
least two thirds of the amount of the class's claims; a class of "interests" [equity holders]
needs approval by at least two thirds of the amount of interests held by voting class
members).
126 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1994).
128 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(b), 1103 (1994).
129 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1994); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms,
Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 714, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1994) ("parties in interest,"
for bankruptcy purposes, include all entities whose interests might be adversely affected by
a proposed action, and have right to notice and to object before court can approve such
action).
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that raise the possibility of a workout or bankruptcy. 130 This is not a difficult
problem for garden-variety issuers of equity securities. 131
Bankruptcy risks faced by common shareholders in most situations do not
differ substantially from nonbankruptcy risks: they cannot be paid dividends if
the corporation is bankrupt, but corporate law in most states will bar directors
from declaring dividends even outside bankruptcy if minimum requirements
such as solvency are unmet. 132 If the business fails, they may receive a share of
its assets only after creditors are paid in full, 133 a rule that bankruptcy law also
respects. 134 Their primary concerns, therefore, are with risks to the overall
business, and bankruptcy adds no special risks requiring disclosure in addition
to normal financial disclosure.
For preferred shareholders, bankruptcy risks begin to diverge, although the
degree of difference depends on the position of the preferred in the issuer's
overall financial structure, and any special characteristics that may be built into
it. Bankruptcy, or insolvency under nonbankruptcy corporate law, will bar
holders from any distributions by the issuer, including both dividends and
distributions of principal under mandatory redemption provisions.' 35 This,
130 Disclosure of specific risk factors applying to any security registered under the
1933 Act is required not just generally by section 11 of the 1933 Act, but specifically by
Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (1996).
131 In this Article "garden-variety" refers to traditional forms of common and
preferred stock. An increasing amount of equity, however, has taken on characteristics that
tend to exclude it from this category, particularly as it assumes more debt-like
characteristics. One such exception to the general rule concerns certain asset-backed
securities that take the form of equity interests in certain pools of assets. See infra text
accompanying notes 188-213.
132 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (West 1990) (corporation may make no
distribution to shareholders if bankruptcy insolvent). N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(a)
(McKinney 1986) (corporation may not distribute property to shareholders if insolvent or if
the distribution would render it insolvent); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.40(c) (1991)
(distributions to shareholders precluded if corporation is insolvent). Delaware is somewhat
unusual in permitting distributions on common stock out of current profits (an unlikely
circumstance if the corporation is insolvent) if the issuer is current on preferred stock
dividends. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1991). Once the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy, distributions to stockholders are additionally precluded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 363,
549, 1107 (1994).
133 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994).
134 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 726(a)(6), 1129(a)(7), 1129(b) (1994). While Chapter 7
bankruptcy dictates the same absolute priority rule as state law, Chapter 11, if anything,
reduces the risks faced by equity holders, because it increases the chance that they will be
paid something even if they would be ineligible for any distribution under absolute priority.
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
135 None of the statutory provisions cited supra note 134, distinguishes between
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however, does not represent any change from normal requirements of state law
for corporate distributions, so that no special bankruptcy disclosure is needed.
Moreover, bankruptcy will preserve preferred shareholders' order of priority
for distribution of the issuer's assets-after creditors, but before common
shareholders. 136
Bankruptcy may, however, have two different kinds of effects on the rights
of preferred shareholders: short-term, over the course of the reorganization,
and long-term, as a result of a confirmed plan. The short-term effects may
make it harder for preferred shareholders to assert some of their contractual
remedies against the issuer for failure to declare one or more dividends
scheduled under the terms of the preferred offering. Remedies typically include
the right to elect certain directors after the board's failure to declare scheduled
preferred dividends for a number of calendar quarters specified in the corporate
charter provisions authorizing issue of the preferred stock. 137 While preferred
stockholders attempting to exercise such remedies will probably have to ask
permission from the bankruptcy court to do so, most remedies short of actual
distributions are likely to be allowed, since bankruptcy courts try to protect
stockholders' rights as far as possible within a reorganization case. 138
Therefore, unless a preferred stock issue incorporates put rights or other rights
to distributions of property, or some genuinely unusual elements, e.g.,
provisions that attempt to protect holders by means such as a reservation of
security interests, 139 short-term effects are likely to be limited to a delay while
permission is obtained from the bankruptcy court.
Long-term effects may be more serious. In a workout, or a reorganization
with sufficient assets for some distribution to equity, a plan of reorganization
may give preferred holders significantly less, vis-a-vis junior security holders,
than the absolute priority rule would normally indicate.140 If there are a
significant number of preferred holders, collective action problems may place
them at a disadvantage with respect to common shareholders in terms of
negotiating favorable plan provisions. Therefore, while disclosure absent
financial weakness or other special circumstances might simply inform
preferred holders that their contractual rights might be altered in bankruptcy,
common and preferred shares insofar as they preclude distributions during the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the issuer.
136 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)C(i), 1129(b)(2)(C) (1994).
137 See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 501
(3d ed. 1983).
138 See, e.g., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1986).
139 See Warren v. King, 108 U.S. 389, 393 (1883).
140 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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disclosure on the approach to bankruptcy should take into account special
circumstances that a reorganization of the issuer would entail, and should
inform them, inter alia, of their right to ask the bankruptcy court for the
appointment of a special, estate-supported committee to represent their
position. 141
C. Bankruptcy Disclosure for Debt Securities
More difficult bankruptcy disclosure problems arise in the context of debt
instruments. Debt instruments have evolved along a wide spectrum, with
immense variation in complexity and degree of risk. They tend to be far more
subject to idiosyncratic contractual provisions than are common stocks, the
normal paradigm for securities law disclosure. Markets for debt securities are
thinner than those for equity securities even absent bankruptcy considerations,
and the approach of insolvency makes them even less liquid. 142 Moreover, debt
securities, more than equity securities, are subject to modification in the
workout process and under the impact of extra-statutory dynamics in Chapter
11 reorganizations; their holders, in order to take advantage of their statutory
rights, are more dependent upon adequate information.
1. Garden-Variety Debt and the Standard Restructuring Model
A great deal of corporate debt should not require elaborate bankruptcy-
related disclosure at the time of initial offering. By analogy to the equity issues
discussed above, we may call this garden-variety debt. To fit this model, debt
should involve a financially strong issuer, with a simple capital structure, that
is, ample equity in proportion to debt, and few layers of debt, with covenants
to prevent management from changing this structure without debtholders'
consent, 143 and nothing in the corporation's history that might raise questions
about new transactions. 144 In this case, it is unlikely that there will be readily
foreseeable risks that a restructuring would significantly change the nature of
debtholders' claims against the issuer and their priority with respect to other
claims. Thus, workout or reorganization risks involving securities of this kind
141 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), 1102(b)(2), 1103 (1994).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
143 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing
Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 371 (1984).144 It is possible that an issuer or its predecessor in interest may have engaged in prior
transactions, such as an LBO, that might raise questions as to the enforceability of new debt,
and related provisions such as security agreements, in bankruptcy. See infra notes 145-57
and accompanying text.
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do not vary sufficiently from the risks of simple failure to be worth the
additional costs imposed by special bankruptcy disclosure.
2. Departures from the Standard Model
Where issuers and financial structure begin to depart from the simple
model discussed above, insolvency risks begin to diverge more markedly from
those of the securities laws general model. As this divergence grows, more
sophisticated insolvency-related disclosure becomes both desirable and cost-
effective.
a. Transactions Raising Bankruptcy Issues: Fraudulent Transfer and
Related Risks
While normal securities law disclosure is based on the paradigm of the
initial public offering, this may not fit the circumstances of securities and
issuers that, because of transactions occurring prior to or simultaneously with
an offering, may have special sensitivities to bankruptcy. LBOs and leveraged
recapitalizations are among the most often discussed transactions raising
bankruptcy issues. 145 Other kinds of transactions that could raise similar
questions include spin-offs intended to separate unencumbered assets from
assets subject to potentially large claims, as in the case of divestitures currently
being contemplated by major producers of tobacco products, or the disposition
of property subject to significant environmental liabilities.
Securities issued in the LBO context and similar transactions may be
145 See, e.g., Moody v. Sec. Pae. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992);
Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986); Wieboldt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. flI. 1988); Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent
Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts [hereinafter Fraudulent Conveyances],
20 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 850-54 (1985); David
Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. Ra. 643 (1987);
Mary Goulet, The Rights of Debtholders When a Leveraged Corporation Fails, 15 J. CoRP.
L. 257, 278-80 (1990); Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of
Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REv. 469 (1988);
Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the
Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.. 781 (1988); Raymond I. Blackwood, Note,
Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to Leveraged Buyouts, 42 DUKE L.I. 340 (1992);
Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1491 (1987).
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
subject to important bankruptcy risk factors. 146 The most important of these is
that the corporate obligations underlying securities of this kind may be
vulnerable to avoidance under the fraudulent transfer laws.
The trustee in bankruptcy and, in reorganizations under Chapter 11, the
DIP, 147 is empowered by the Bankruptcy Code to avoid fraudulent transfers
made by the debtor prior to the bankruptcy petition. 148 A transfer may be
avoided as fraudulent, regardless of the actual intent of the transferor, if it was
made for less than reasonably equivalent value and the transferor was insolvent
or had "unreasonably small capital" 149 at the time of the transfer or as a result
146 The same fraudulent transfer analysis that applies to LBOs also applies to leveraged
recapitalizations. Transactions of this kind also became common during the late 1980s,
usually as a defensive measure employed by a target subject to a takeover bid. Like LBOs,
they replace a large proportion of a corporation's equity with debt. In a leveraged
recapitalization, shareholders do not sell out their interests. Instead, the issuing corporation
borrows to pay shareholders a large one-time dividend. Although the amounts paid may be
close to the amounts paid to shareholders in an LBO, they retain their shares (now generally
referred to as "stubs"), entitling them to equity interests in a corporation whose equity has
been drastically reduced. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive
Tactics, and the Business Judgment Rule, in 1 CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1991, at
196-203 (PLI Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 730, 1991).
147 The term "DIP" designates the management of a debtor reorganizing under the
Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor in bankruptcy
normally continues to be run by its prebankruptcy management, which assumes most of the
rights and duties of a trustee in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a), 1108
(1994). See U.S. Brass & Copper Co. v. Caplan (In re Century Brass Prods.), 22 F.3d 37,
39-40 (2d Cir. 1994) (Bankruptcy Code section 1107 gives DIP the trustee's power to avoid
preferences); Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 633 (E.D. Va. 1993) (DIP
stands in trustee's shoes in every way); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (dictum that DIP management has trustee's fiduciary
duties). See also infra note 197 and accompanying text.
148 The trustee may act under Bankruptcy Code section 548, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994),
which creates a specific cause of action in bankruptcy for the avoidance of fraudulent
transfers, or, under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b), 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994), may
challenge transfers under applicable state fraudulent transfer law. State law may be
preferable because of longer limitations periods. Bankruptcy Code section 548 provides a
reachback period of one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1994). The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("U.F.T.A."), on the other hand, provides a
general limitations period of four years, U.F.T.A. § 9(b) (1984), and permits a creditor to
challenge a deliberately fraudulent transfer within a year after the creditor discovered (or
should have discovered) the fraudulent transaction. Other state statutes, such as the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("U.F.C.A."), have other limitations periods.
149 Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act defines the
term "unreasonably small capital," and one of the key problems in contemporary fraudulent
transfer law is deciding what constitutes unreasonably small capital for a particular debtor.
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of the transaction.150 For purposes of fraudulent transfer law, transfers include
the incurrence of obligations and the granting of security interests. 151
In an LBO, a target corporation is acquired by an entity (which may
include members of the target corporation's management) that borrows most of
the funds used to pay the target's stockholders. Usually, the target and the
acquiring entity then legally merge and the corporation becomes liable for
funds used for its own acquisition.152 Moreover, senior acquisition debt is
normally secured by liens on assets of the target. 153 Arguably, since the
obligations and the liens securing them are created to obtain funds that are used
not for the corporation's own benefit but for that of its former stockholders,
their creation involves a transfer by the corporation in exchange for less than
reasonably equivalent value.' 5 4 The other element required for characterizing
the transfer as fraudulent may then be found if the corporation was rendered
insolvent by the transaction, or left with "unreasonably small capital" for its
business.155 While such a financial state may be apparent from the
corporation's subsequent bankruptcy, it is difficult to prove in actual
litigation. 156 Therefore, a fraudulent transfer challenge to an LBO poses the
risks that securities issued to finance an LBO-including securities issued by a
post-acquisition corporate entity to retire institutional debt-will face challenges
to the validity of the debtor's obligations to the security holders and to the
validity of any security interests supporting such obligations. 157
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)ii) (1994); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(i) (1984); Fraudulent
Conveyances, supra note 145, at 20-21; Markell, supra note 145.
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
151 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994).
152 See Fraudulent Conveyances, supra note 145, at 3-4.
153 See, e.g., Moody v. See. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1060-62 (3d Cir.
1992); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
154 See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1065; Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications,
Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803
F.2d 1288, 1300-02 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Jones v. National City Bank (In re Greenbrook
Carpet Co.), 722 F.2d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1984).
155 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (1994). The U.F.T.A. uses the substantially
equivalent phrase "was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were too small in relation to the business or
transaction." U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)i) (1984). Its predecessor statute, the U.F.C.A., still in
effect in several states, including New York, see N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81,
uses the phrase "unreasonably small capital." U.F.C.A. § 5 (1918).
156 See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1072-75, 1076 (post-LBO bankruptcy held caused by
unforeseeable decline in sales rather than lack of capital).
157 See, e.g., Smyser, supra note 143, at 810-11.
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b. Junk Bonds
Junk bonds158 pose several different kinds of risks. The most obvious are
the credit risks that have resulted in their classification as "junk," i.e., factors
reducing the probability that holders will receive timely payments of principal
and interest. Such factors do not change significantly as a matter of bankruptcy
policy, and so credit risks in and of themselves require no special bankruptcy
disclosure.
The credit risks may, however, be so high that a workout or bankruptcy
reorganization is a readily foreseeable rather than a purely theoretical risk.' 5 9
This would place the issuer in the category of financial instability described
below. For junk bond holders, this will require not only simple disclosure that
there is high risk of nonpayment, but that the promised high yields that form
the chief inducement to acquire junk bonds might well face sharp reduction in
the workout or reorganization process. 160 It could also require special
descriptions of the dynamics of the insolvency process, including the fact that
holders may have interests opposed to those of other creditors and, in the event
of insolvency, might be well advised to demand a special committee of their
own.
161
Moreover, junk bond holders may face special risks in the event of their
issuer's bankruptcy. These are risks created by the bankruptcy process when
applied to particular characteristics of certain junk bond issues. They include all
the risks inherent in the transactional history of the issues, as where the junk
bonds were issued pursuant to an LBO. 162
Additionally, these bondholders may face special risks, beyond those
facing the holders of other securities issued pursuant to the same transactions.
A key risk of this kind is that their securities, which they purchased under the
label "debt," may be recharacterized by the bankruptcy court as equity. 163 The
158 For purposes of this Article, junk bonds will be defined as securities, denominated
as debt, that either have not been rated, or which have been rated at less than investment
grade by one or more of the national securities rating organizations.
159 See, e.g., BRUCK, supra note 67, at 74-75.
160 See, e.g., id. at 73-77; Aaron Pressman, A New Calculus Speeds Bankntptcy
Disputes: Republic Health's Prepackaged Reorganization, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DiG.,
Dec. 24, 1990, at 20.
161 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Food, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2
F.3d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1993) (purported secured debt held by insiders of undercapitalized
firm recharacterized as equity); Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate
Finance: The Treatment of Junk Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137, 1152
(1991).
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result of this would be that they could find themselves subordinated to the
claims of all creditors of the debtor, and not merely to those senior creditors to
whom the junk bonds were expressly subordinated.
c. Environmental Issues
Environmental issues have become matters of great concern to investors,
not only as a matter of public policy, but because liabilities under state and
federal environmental law can be so massive as to constitute major risks to a
corporation's financial stability. 164 Federal statutes such as CERCLA,'165
RCRA, 166 and their state counterparts impose virtually unlimited costs for
cleaning up property contaminated by toxic substances upon past and present
owners and managers of the sites in question. The liability is without fault, and
defenses are limited. Risks of this kind, though often arcane, can involve such
enormous liabilities that the SEC now requires issuers to disclose
environmental risks as part of standard disclosure under the securities laws. 167
What has not been generally recognized to date is that, beyond general
risks to investors, environmental liabilities have come to pose increasing
hazards to creditors in the bankruptcy context. 168 These risks are particularly
164 Over 32,000 hazardous waste sites have now been discovered across the United
States, and an eventual total of 75,000 has been estimated. Total estimated cleanup costs
now exceed $1 trillion. See Philip H. Abelson, Remediation of Hazardous Waste Sites, 255
SCIENCE 901 (1992).
165 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
166 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994).
167 See Reg. S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (1996); Accounting and
Disclosures Relating to Loss Contingencies, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg.
32,843 (1993); Office of the Chief Accountant, SEC, Accounting Developments, in 3 THE
SEC SPEAKs IN 1995, at 12-15 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-882, 1995); Kathy E.B. Robb, SEC Trains Its Eye on the Environment, NATL. L.J, Mar.
8, 1993, at 23; Richard Y. Roberts & Kurt R. Hohl, Environmental Liability Disclosure and
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 50 Bus. LAw. 1 (1994); Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of
Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-
Based Incentivesfor Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1093 (1994).
168 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986);
Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport Ic.), 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.
1993); In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); Penn Terra
Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) (automatic stay under
Bankruptcy Code section 362(a) held inapplicable to environmental cleanup action by state
agency); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984); Robert R. Graves, 7he Interaction of the Bankruptcy Code
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noteworthy because they are not always readily ascertained from
straightforward application of the Bankruptcy Code to an analysis of
nonbankruptcy liabilities under environmental law, but result from the
dynamics of the bankruptcy process and major inconsistencies between the
ways in which bankruptcy and environmental law contemplate the assessment
of liabilities. The Bankruptcy Code, recognizing that reorganizations are likely
to fail unless all claims against the reorganizing debtor can be quickly assessed,
provides for the bankruptcy court to estimate the amounts of contingent and
unliquidated claims so that the case may be expeditiously concluded. 169
Environmental statutes such as CERCLA, on the other hand, do not take the
competing claims of other creditors into account, nor the fact that all creditors,
including environmental claimants such as the Environmental Protection
Agency, may suffer if a reorganization fails. They contemplate assessment of
liability on a delayed basis, after the full costs of cleanup have been
determined. 170
Moreover, partly because of the inconsistencies in the ways in which the
two bodies of law view liabilities, the priority of environmental claims as
compared to the claims of other creditors is uncertain in ways that are not at all
clear from the statutory text. The Bankruptcy Code does not give
environmental claims a priority over general unsecured claims, 171 although
states and the federal government are free to enact statutes giving
environmental agencies liens to secure environmental cleanup costs. 172 Courts,
however, have been dealing with cleanup claims by state and federal agencies
in ways that threaten to create priority over the claims of other creditors,
and the Environmental Laws: The Grit, the Grind, and the Grease, 29 WILLAMME L.
RLv. 297 (1993); Joel M. Gross & Suzanne Lacampagne, Bankruptcy Estimation of
CERCLA Claims: The Process and the Alternatives, 12 VA. ENv. L.. 235 (1993); Kathryn
R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J 69
(1993); Claudia MacLachlan, Asbestos Claims Hang Over One of the '80s Big Buyouts,
NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 29, 1993, at 1; Arlene Elgert Mirsky et al., The Interface Between
Bankruptcy and Environnwntal Laws, 46 Bus. LAw. 626 (1991); Mark Roe, Bankruptcy
and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1984); Daniel Klerman, Comment, Earth First?
CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bankruptcy, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 795 (1991).
169 See 11 U.S.C. §502(c) (1994).
170 See Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency (In re
Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc.), 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988); Gross & Lacampagne,
supra note 168, at 236-40.
171 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994); Gross & Lacampagne, supra note 168, at 243; see
also Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc. v. Williams Envtl. Services, Inc. (In re Fmevest Foods,
Inc.), 165 B.R. 949, 956 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (environmental cleanup not secured
under mechanics' lien law).
172 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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despite absence of a statutory priority in the Bankruptcy Code or liens backed
by public filings that would otherwise put third-party creditors on notice. 173
The most severe danger of this sort is that courts may require the
bankruptcy estate to pay the full costs of a cleanup of toxic waste, rather than
treating it as just another claim to be paid pro rata with other claims of equal
statutory priority, giving such costs a superpriority 174 that is not provided for
by the Bankruptcy Code or principles of debtor-creditor law governing
recovery by creditors outside of bankruptcy. 175 The effect of this would be to
deprive other creditors of most or all of the recovery from the bankruptcy
estate to which they would otherwise be entitled, without the advance notice
provided by a U.C.C. or other public lien filing. 176 Even without going so far,
a court may hold environmental cleanup claims asserted after the
commencement of the case to be entitled to administrative expense priority. 177
Such priority would place such claims ahead of those of general creditors,
including debenture holders. It could also make it substantially more difficult to
formulate and confirm a plan of reorganization, thereby increasing the risk of a
liquidation in which security holders would receive little or nothing. 178
The drastic extent of the potential harm to securities holders indicates that
this is exactly the sort of material information requiring disclosure. Here, the
risks apply not only to the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization, but also to a
liquidation under Chapter 7.179 Disclosure concerning both possibilities is
therefore appropriate in any circumstances where bankruptcy is a real option
for management to consider.
173 Although there is no provision in federal law for "superliens" that prime existing
liens, at least nine states have provided for such hens. See Mirsky et al., supra note 168, at
688-89.
174 See, e.g., Donovan v. TMC Indus., Ltd., 20 B.R. 997, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1982).
175 See, e.g., Torwico Elecs., Inc. v. New Jersey, Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 8 F.3d
146, 150-51 (3d Cir. 1993); Alan B. Miller & Jeffrey L. Tannenbaum, Bankruptcy, NAT'L
L.., June 20, 1994, at B4.
176 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
516-17 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Serv. v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 569 (3d Cir.
1994); Juniper Dev. Corp. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.), 73 B.R. 494
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), aftid, 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991); Mirsky et al., supra note
168, at 654-56; Klerman, supra note 168, at 800-03. But see id. at 803-11.
178 See Mirsky et al., supra note 168, at 655.
179 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 494; United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857
F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,
277-78 (3d Cir. 1984).
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d. Where Financial Instability Is Present at the Time of Issue
Even in the absence of special transaction or structural characteristics
posing particular bankruptcy risks, appropriate disclosure becomes a complex
question when, at the time securities are issued, the issuer is financially frail. In
this situation, disclosure may easily be underinclusive or overinclusive, and we
must consider, given the high degree of uncertainty attaching to investment in
this situation, just how precisely disclosure needs to deal with all attendant
risks in order to be acceptable.
It is important to understand in this context that this set of problems applies
not just to the normal paradigm of an initial public offering where the issuer is
genuinely new to the securities markets, but also to cases where the offering
follows a prior history with lingering consequences, such as a workout, prior
Chapter 11, or a highly leveraged transaction.180 In all of these cases, although
additional problems may arise from the prior history, such as fraudulent
transfer issues resulting from a highly leveraged transaction, the basic analysis
is similar: the issuer is frail enough that a purchaser of its securities must
consider a workout or bankruptcy as a short-term possibility. Here, the analysis
is similar to that for continuing disclosure by a distressed issuer of outstanding
securities,181 except that the standard for disclosure is substantially stricter: the
due diligence and negligence standard of section 11 of the 1933 Act,18 2 rather
than the scienter standard of Rule 10b-5.
3. Legal Opinions on Solvency-Related Issues
The proliferation of bankruptcy-sensitive transactions and securities has
generated new demand for special opinions by attorneys on solvency-related
issues in connection with the issuance of securities. This is a substantial change
from earlier practice, in which attorneys generally excepted bankruptcy risks
from opinions. While many attorneys would still prefer to limit their opinions
to nonbankruptcy law-not just because bankruptcy law is arcane, but because
it includes greater elements of uncertainty than the issues on which corporate
lawyers prefer to opine-they are with increasing frequency being asked to give
opinions on the bankruptcy consequences of particular transactions.18 3 This is
180 See supra notes 135-143 and accompanying text.
181 See infra notes 227-242 and accompanying text.
182 See Dannenberg v. PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc.), 50 F.3d
615, 621 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 274 (1995).
183 See MacLahlan, supra note 168, at 36 (RTC studying possible liability of Latham
& Watkins for opinion there was little risk in ]LBO where there were substantial
environmental issues); Andrew Blum, Awaiting Word from SEC Asbestos Cases Turn on
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especially true in the case of asset-backed securities, where favorable opinions
by issuers' counsel on issues such as the "true sale" of receivables,18 4 and the
safety of a finance subsidiary from being substantively consolidated with its
parent in a bankruptcy of the latter,' 8 5 are required by rating agencies as
preconditions for high investment-grade ratings.
It is difficult, but not impossible, to impose liability upon attorneys for
legal opinions.' 86 Bankruptcy-related opinions rendered for purposes of
securities issuance may, however, involve special elements that put them
outside the normal run of legal opinions. Opinions of this kind play a more
central role in the issue of securities with special bankruptcy sensitivity than do
more traditional opinions in the issue of more traditional securities. Rather than
simply being a certification that routine tasks have been handled properly, these
opinions are an essential element in assembling a custom-designed structure,
and other elements indispensable to the marketing of such securities, such as
their ratings by major agencies, depend on them in nonroutine ways. 187
Bankruptcy disclosure therefore needs to deal directly with opinions of this
kind. Not only are the conclusions of such opinions material, but their degree
of certainty-or the absence thereof-should also be disclosed. The degree to
which an opinion has been qualified, and the basis for such qualification-such
as the absence of controlling authority-may be as significant as the accounting
information that has traditionally played a central role in disclosure. Moreover,
circumstances relevant to the process of giving the opinion should also be
disclosed, including positions held by attorneys as officers or directors of the
issuer, the fact that a law firm has declined to give an opinion, or
circumstances accompanying a change in issuer's counsel during the course of
an offering.
LBO, NAT'LLJ., Sept. 2, 1991, at3, 37.
184 See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
185 See infra notes 201-205 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 779-84 (3d Cir. 1985); Kline v.
First W. Gov't Sec. Inc., 794 F. Supp. 542, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 24 F.3d 480, 492 (3d Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs held to have stated Rule 10b-5 claims
against law firm based on certain statements in opinion letter); Stevens v. Equidyne
Extractive Indus., 694 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see Kline v. First W.
Gov't. See. Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (triable issue of fact raised by firm
opinion on forward contract investments).
187 See, e.g., Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus.
LAW. 527, 529-32 (1995) [hereinafter Structured Financing]; The Tribar Opinion
Committee, Special Report by the Tribar Opinion Conmnittee: Opinions in tie Bankruptcy
Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. LAw.
718, 720 (1991) [hereinafter Tribar Opinion Conmdttee Report].
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D. Structured Finance and the Mysterious Art of Bankruptcy-Proofing
Structured finance, like junk bonds, emerged from obscurity into the
daylight of Wall Street during the 1980s. 188 Structured finance instruments,
however, are marketed as a kind of financial mirror image to junk bonds: they
are sold primarily on the basis of safety, usually with the highest possible
ratings. 189 An essential element of these high ratings is the premise that
properly structured securities of this type are supposed to be "bankruptcy-
proof," that is, cash flow to their holders will continue even if the entity for
whose benefit they are issued winds up in Chapter 11 or worse. 190
1. Bankruptcy-Sensitive Securities: Asset-Backed Securities
Certain types of securities may be particularly sensitive to risks arising
from the bankruptcy process itself. Asset-backed securities are among the most
important securities of this kind. 191
Although any security in which the issuer's obligation is supported by a
security interest in real or personal property may be described as an "asset-
backed security," the term can be used to designate two very different types of
security: (1) conventional bonds backed by security interests in real or personal
property; and (2) the recently developed types of securities that look primarily
to the cash flow from specific pools of interest-earning assets, rather than to
earnings from general corporate operations, for payment of principal and
interest. These include mortgage-backed securities and similar securities backed
by pools of loans secured by personalty such as automobiles and farm
equipment, and by assignment of accounts receivable such as credit card
balances. Wall Street argot often refers to the general field of designing and
issuing such securities as "structured finance," largely because it attempts to
use corporate structure to isolate the assets used to back the securities from
188 See Andrew S. Carron, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, in THE HANDBOOK
OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES, at 549-52 (Frank J. Fabozzi & T. Dessa Fabozzi eds., 4th
ed. 1995); Tracy Hudson van Eck, Asset-Backed Securities, in THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED
INCOMn SECUrrimS at 584, 592-93 (Frank J. Fabozzi & T. Dessa Fabozzi eds., 4th ed.
1995); Tribar Opinion Committee Report, supra note 187, at 720.
189 See Hudson van Eck, supra note 188, at 583.
190e STEvEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURrIZATION 1, 16-24, passim (2d ed. 1993); Lois R. Lupica, Asset
Securitization Transactions: A Third Party Perspective 10, 25-26 (July 23, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
191 See generally SCHWARCZ, supra note 190.
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general creditors of the entity for whose benefit they are issued. 192
Both types of securities re offered to investors as safer instruments, that
is, more certain as to payment of principal and interest, than obligations of
their issuers not backed by specific assets. The safety of both, however, is
significantly affected by the structure of the bankruptcy reorganization
process.' 9 3 Certain aspects of the very features designed to provide greater
safety to holders of the instruments may be especially sensitive to the powers
available to some of the likely participants in a reorganization case, or to the
dynamics of such a case.
Because of this, the focus of bankruptcy disclosure needs to be on those
aspects of bankruptcy that add uncertainty to investors' prospects of payment of
principal and interest on their instruments. This is not to say that such
disclosure should simply run a parade of horribles before investors, since that
might in itself either mislead as to real risks or anaesthetize investors into
disregarding risks entirely. Rather, it should discuss aspects of the bankruptcy
process-not only as to statutory or otherwise settled law, but also the
dynamics of the reorganization process-which could reduce or delay otherwise
assured recovery. If the law in the area is unsettled, which is highly probable
for the newer types of structured securities, then that fact is clearly material to
the issue of whether the structuring will be effective in assuring the securities'
intended safety in the face of the bankruptcy process.
2. Traditional Secured Obligations
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the priority of traditional secured
obligations, provided that the security interests are properly perfected.
194
Nonetheless, bankruptcy creates special risks for holders of such instruments,
going well beyond the generic risk that the collateral securing the obligations
will not be adequate to pay principal and interest on the debt.
The most straightforward risks arise from the way in which bankruptcy
192 See id. at 1-2, 10-16; see also Linda Grant Williams, Real Estate Law, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 26, 1994, at B5. For convenience, this general category of asset-backed
securities will hereinafter be referred to as "structured securities."
193 The issues discussed in the text that follows concern the reorganization process
under Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 only, and not the liquidation process under Chapter 7.
Under Chapter 7, properly perfected security interests are not disturbed, pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code section 506, and the problems of delay and potential substitution will be
significantly less serious because the trustee is primarily concerned with quick liquidation of
the debtor's assets, rather than continuing to operate the debtor's business.194 See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 413 (1992);
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Long v. Bullard, 117
U.S. 617 (1886).
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tests the adequacy of the perfection of the creditors' security interests. Since
bankruptcy's prevailing norm for distribution is that all creditors should share
pro rata in the bankruptcy estate, deviations from creditor equality such as
those resulting from security interests are construed narrowly. Therefore, the
trustee in bankruptcy is given the power to avoid any security interest that is
not adequately perfected under the law of the jurisdiction in which the security
interest was created. 195 Moreover, a security interest may be avoidable as a
preference if perfection was not substantially simultaneous with the transaction,
and if it occurred within ninety days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 196 In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the DIP has substantially the same
avoiding powers as the trustee in bankruptcy. 197
The avoiding powers are not likely, however, to be the most important
threat to holders of secured debt in bankruptcy. Perfection is a largely
ministerial task that should not be difficult if those charged with it act with
minimal competence. If there are potential problems, though, as where the
property subject to the security interest is located in a state where rules
governing perfection are problematic, such problems should be disclosed.
Other problems may be more serious. Delay is likely to pose a problem to
secured creditors in most bankruptcy cases. Secured creditors are barred from
seizing their collateral by the automatic stay in bankruptcy, 198 and the delay
that this causes may be lengthy in reorganization cases. Delay may be
particularly serious in situations where collateral is subject to quick
deterioration in value. Although the Bankruptcy Code gives creditors the right
to ask the court to lift the stay to let them seize their collateral in such cases, 199
stay litigation is uncertain in outcome and involves substantial transaction costs.
Other risks are less likely to occur, but may be more serious where they do
occur. This is particularly true of the trustee's power, with consent of the
bankruptcy court, to substitute collateral. 200 This power might be especially
195 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994); U.S. Brass & Copper Co. v. Caplan (In re
Century Brass Prods.), 22 F.3d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1994) (11 U.S.C. § 1107 gives the DIP
the trustee's power to avoid preferences). Unless otherwise expressly stated, all references
to the "trustee" in this Article also refer to the DIP in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
199 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)-(f) (1994). The Bankrupety Code gives secured
creditors the right to have the stay lifted for "cause," (including lack of "adequate
protection" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 361 of their interests) or if they can show that the
debtor has no equity in the property concerned and that it is not necessary to the debtor's
reorganization.
200 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361(2), 364(d) (1994); Resources Unlimited, Inc. v. Envtl.
Waste Control, Inc., 158 B.R. 998, 999 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (ordering debtor to use cash
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tempting to a DIP looking for liquid assets with which to finance a
reorganization. Although substituted collateral is supposed to have the same
value as that which it replaced, it is possible that it could have certain
characteristics that would be particularly undesirable to the holders of asset-
backed securities, such as lower liquidity and different cash-flow
characteristics.
3. Structured Finance Instrmnents
Bankruptcy risks are even more important in the relatively new field of
structured finance. In fact, one of the chief reasons for the "structuring" in
question is an attempt to minimize insolvency20 1 risks: to remove holders of an
instrument of this kind from involvement in the insolvency of the entities for
whose ultimate benefit the instruments issue. The object is to obtain a higher
rating-and hence a lower cost of credit-than the parent could obtain for any
securities it might issue. The structuring consists of establishing finance
subsidiaries isolated from their parents to a degree that is intended to isolate
such subsidiaries from their parents' bankruptcy. 202 The finance subsidiaries
are the actual issuers of the securities in question, although their parents are the
intended beneficiaries of such financing. Isolating the subsidiaries from their
parents' bankruptcy is designed to permit them to receive higher ratings (and
collateral for environmental cleanup, providing secured creditor can receive "adequate
protection").
201 In this context, the term "insolvency" is more appropriate than the narrower term
"bankruptcy," because many of the corporate parents whose needs are being financed
through these techniques are banks, savings and loan associations, and other financial
institutions that are barred from becoming debtors under the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1994). These institutions' insolvency is governed by other bodies
of law, including both federal law, see, e.g., the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, &
Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at
various sections of 12 U.S.C.); and state law, see, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 606 (1990).
Although it has been held that bank receivership and analogous means for reorganizing or
winding up other financial institutions have different purposes than bankruptcy, see, e.g.,
Corbin v. Federal Res. Bank of N.Y., 629 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1980), the techniques
used to attempt to isolate such institutions from special-purpose finance subsidiaries used to
issue asset-backed securities are substantially the same as in cases where the parent may
become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.
202 While this is normally prospective, i.e., an attempt to make sure that assets
collateralizing structured securities do not become part of the parent's bankruptcy estate
should it file a bankruptcy petition, structured finance techniques have even been used to
issue investment-grade rated securities collateralized by receivables of debtors already in
Chapter 11 (e.g., Allied Stores). See SCHwARCZ, supra note 190, at 40-45.
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therefore lower interest rates) for their debt (or, in some cases, preferred stock)
than their parents would be able to receive.
a. Isolating the Special Purpose Entity: The Mechanics of
Nonconsolidation
One of the important structuring techniques used to enhance the ratings of
asset-backed instruments is to attempt to isolate the nominal issuer of the
instruments from the entity for whose ultimate benefit they are being issued.
This normally takes the form of what has been termed a "special purpose
entity": 20 3 a trust or special-purpose finance subsidiary controlled by the parent
entity, which is contractually barred from incurring obligations other than to
the holders of the asset-backed instruments.
The purpose of establishing such a subsidiary is to create an entity not
subject to the claims of creditors other than the holders of the structured finance
instruments. The financial distress of its parent, therefore, is intended to have
little effect upon the holders of such instruments. The assets collateralizing
these instruments will not be subject to the claims of the parent's creditors, and
the parent's bankruptcy need not involve a bankruptcy filing for the subsidiary.
A key threat to this structure is the bankruptcy doctrine of substantive
consolidation. In bankruptcy, a legally distinct parent and its subsidiaries may,
under certain circumstances, have their assets and liabilities pooled as if they
were a single entity.204 Obviously, this would undo the entire purpose of
creating a separate issuing entity, and rating services therefore require, as a
prerequisite for a premium rating for structured securities, a legal opinion that
a finance subsidiary should not be substantively consolidated with its parent in
the event of the latter's bankruptcy. 205
With this objective in mind, finance subsidiaries are designed to minimize
the risk of this kind of bankruptcy treatment. The design normally reflects
substantive consolidation case law, and typically requires measures to insure
more than purely nominal financial and administrative independence of the
finance subsidiary, including offices and officers separate from that of the
parent. Issuers' counsel are typically expected to back their design with the
requisite nonconsolidation opinions.
Both designs and opinions of this sort have weaknesses that need to be
203 See Tibar Opinion Committee Report, supra note 187, at 725.
204 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 58 (2d
Cir. 1992); 5 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1100.06, at 1100-33
(Laurence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
205 See Tribar Opinion Cormittee Report, supra note 187, at 725-27; SCMVARCZ,
supra note 190, at 16-26.
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reflected in securities law disclosure. Securities of this kind are given top
ratings and sold as "bankruptcy-proof," relying substantially on
nonconsolidation opinions. Unfortunately, opinions of this kind rest on a
structure of largely untested assumptions. Substantive consolidation is a form
of nonstatutory equitable relief that courts impose on a case-by-case basis; it is
difficult to predict that a court will rule on a given structure in a given way,
particularly when actual operation of a corporate structure may differ
substantially from its original paper design. Moreover, structured securities of
this sort are new enough that there are still few, if any, actual tests of them in
litigation. While the structures may in fact turn out to be perfectly good, buyers
of securities of this kind should be informed that a particular structure has not
been tested in court.
b. Isolating the Collateral. The Fabulous "True Sale" and the U. C. C.
Another important element in the isolation of the nominal issuer from the
corporate beneficiary concerns the nature of the assets underlying the securities
in question. These are generally pools of income-producing instruments such as
mortgages and automobile loans, which the corporate parent transfers to its
finance subsidiary at closing.206 The problem concerns the nature of their
transfer from the ultimate corporate beneficiary to the finance subsidiary that is
the nominal issuer of the securities.
Since the primary object of structuring the transaction is to isolate the
issuing subsidiary from a bankruptcy of its parent, rating agencies are
especially concerned that the income-producing instruments transferred from
the parent to the finance subsidiary have been sold, rather than merely
hypothecated. If a transaction could be characterized as a secured loan, then the
corporate parent would retain an interest in them, which would become an asset
of its bankruptcy estate. In that event, the subsidiary could not alienate them
without approval of the bankruptcy court, and the assets could not be said to
have been truly isolated from its bankruptcy.20 7
Therefore, in structuring transactions of this kind, rating agencies normally
206 Many types of income-producing instruments may be assembled into pools to
provide the cash flow for asset-backed securities. While mortgages were the first
instruments thus used, and are still predominantly used, the structured finance industry has
steadily expanded the varieties of instruments that may thus be used, from car loans to
credit card receivables, and now even trade receivables. See, e.g., BT Securities Corp.
advertisements for Gaylord Receivables Master Trust and Weirton Steel Corp., Trade-
Receivables Backed Program, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1993, at C3 (advertisements).
207 See SCHWARCZ, supra note 190, at 28-31.
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insist that the transfer be characterized as a "true sale."2 08 Unfortunately, while
the consequences of the distinction between a sale and a transfer for security
may be significant in bankruptcy, the U.C.C. does not draw a clear line
between a true sale and a transfer for security, where the subject matter of the
transaction consists of accounts or chattel paper209-categories that include the
income-producing property typically used to provide payment streams to
holders of structured finance instruments. 210 The same steps are taken to
perfect a sale of such instruments as to perfect a loan transaction with a security
interest in them. The situation is similar to the difficulty that exists in
distinguishing between a lease of personal property and a sale on credit in
which the seller retains a security interest in the goods sold. 21'
This creates a significant uncertainty in a supposedly "bankruptcy-proof"
structure. Absent statutory support for a clear distinction between a true sale
and a secured transaction, lawyers structuring securities backed by pools of
receivables try to give their structures characteristics of absolute transfer, so
that a bankruptcy court reviewing a transaction would be likely to consider it a
sale rather than a transfer for security. Unfortunately, there is little case law
available to support such characterization. Nonetheless, favorable ratings for
such securitizations normally require legal opinions to the effect that a court
considering the transaction would, or at least would be likely to, hold it to be a
true sale rather than a secured transaction.
4. The Problem of Corner-Cutting
The uncertainty of both of these techniques is increased by the propensity
of certain issuers to attempt to have their cake and eat it: to achieve the sought-
after isolation from bankruptcy without incurring the requisite costs and loss of
control. Indeed, some of the "enhancements" added to packages of receivables
or similar sources of cash flow to make them more attractive to investors may
208 See id. at 28-29.
209 Under U.C.C. section 9-105(1)(b), "chattel paper" means a writing or set of
writings evidencing both a monetary obligation and a supporting security interest in, or
lease of, specific personal property. The pools of receivables such as car loans that make up
collateral for a large portion of the structured finance instruments on the securities markets
fit this definition. U.C.C. section 9-105(1)(d) provides that for U.C.C. purposes, the term
"debtor" includes not only a person who owes payment or other performance on an
obligation secured by accounts or chattel paper, but also a seller of accounts or chattel
paper.
210 See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1)(b), 9-105(c), (d), (m), 9-302 cmt. 5, 9-308.
21 1 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37); LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDrr: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 434-35 (1995).
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undermine their isolation from the bankruptcy of transferors. For example, the
purported seller of a pool of receivables may retain some of the risk of default
by the underlying debtors. The retention of risk tends to undermine the attempt
to characterize the transfer as absolute, giving it more of the substance of a
secured loan.
Competition among underwriters and among bond counsel may further
aggravate this problem, particularly given the increasingly short time horizons
imposed by volatile market conditions. Prospective underwriters and counsel
eager for business may compete to accept flimsier structures, applying high
discounts to the chance of future liability if the structures should fail at an
unpredictably distant economic downturn.
This may have particularly unfortunate effects if the ultimate beneficiary
does end up in bankruptcy. Ultimately, all structures that are intended to isolate
a finance subsidiary from the ultimate beneficiary of its securities is intended to
separate some of the beneficiary's best assets from its general creditors. Each
of the remedies discussed above-substantive consolidation, recharacterization
of true sales as secured loans, etc.-thus collapses analytically into the original
model of fraudulent transfer avoidance.212 Each is thus an equitable remedy,
more likely to be applied to undo a transaction if the parties to the transaction
have behaved inequitably toward innocent third parties-in this case creditors
of the corporate parent, whose ability to collect on their claims is weakened by
the transfer of liquid assets to finance subsidiaries. Corner-cutting, in which the
beneficiary attempts to overreach, will therefore make it far more likely that at
least one of these equitable remedies will actually be applied.
One of the advantages of requiring a high level of disclosure in this
context, aside from alerting purchasers of the securities to problems such as the
indeterminacy of existing law, is its effect on comer-cutting. A high standard
of disclosure will have the effect of forcing a high level of due diligence with
respect to the legal structure in question, particularly on the part of
underwriters and their counsel, 213 and will also tend to motivate SEC staff to
ask questions concerning unfamiliar structures. This strict legal scrutiny
appears to be one of the most effective means to control corner-cutting.
E. Circularity
As noted above, the federal securities laws are primarily disclosure
statutes. 214 In the bankruptcy context, however, a unique problem lurks at the
212 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90
HARv. L. REV. 505, 517-18 (1977).
213 See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe
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center of the disclosure labyrinth. This may be called the problem of
circularity: the risk that disclosure may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In
the absence of clear guidance from the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, the
bankruptcy court may be tempted to rely on the "parade of horribles" in the
disclosure documents prepared for the issue in question, in deciding how to
characterize them for bankruptcy purposes.215
Such reliance creates a tension between securities and bankruptcy law that
requires a solution that will best serve the purposes of both. Where potential
securities purchasers must be informed of possible alternative legal implications
of an undeveloped area of the law, securities lawyers should not be deterred
from thoughtfully enumerating the risks posed by a possible legal
characterization, for fear that a bankruptcy court may base a later adverse
holding on the fact that the securities holders were warned of it in the
disclosure materials.
Circularity is further complicated by what may be called its strong and
weak forms. The strong form, as discussed above, is the problem that the
disclosure may itself become the basis for adverse legal characterization. It is a
special case of the weak form, which ultimately presents more difficult
problems. Weak form circularity consists of the total set of problems that an
issuer may incur as the result of securities law disclosure of insolvency, its
approach, and its effects upon corporate obligations. It includes risks that
disclosure may precipitate adverse actions by creditors, and that detailed
disclosure on the weaknesses of a structure will form a road map for litigation
for potential plaintiffs contemplating targets of opportunity.
Since strong form circularity is a more straightforward problem, it is
helpful to consider it first. Its less convoluted nature does not make it less
serious, but does make it more amenable to remedy.
1. In the Fraudulent Transfer Context
The litigation of corporate fraudulent transfer issues has become
increasingly common in recent years. This has been especially true in cases
Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977)); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); COXET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
215 See In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. 51, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
disclosure material on bankruptcy risks in holding original issue discount not payable, and
in calculating amount of original issue discount), aft'd, 130 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 961 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1992);
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. fI1. 1988) (holding controlling
shareholders liable in part because they had been legally advised of possible characterization
of IBO as fraudulent transfer).
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where bankruptcy occurs in the wake of transactions such as LBOs. 216
Prebankruptcy transfers may be avoided by a bankruptcy court as
constructively fraudulent, 217 or as fraudulent by actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. 218 The consequences of a finding that a transfer was
fraudulent by actual intent may be substantially harsher than if it is merely
found to be constructively fraudulent. 219 The problem of circularity arises
because disclosure of the risk of fraudulent transfer avoidance in offering
materials might render the transfers fraudulent not just constructively but by
actual intent.
There are two important consequences of such a finding. The first is that a
finding of actual intent might be easier for a trustee in bankruptcy to establish
than a finding that the challenged transaction was constructively fraudulent.
This is because the latter finding requires difficult factual proofs of the elements
of a constructively fraudulent transfer-iLe., that the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer or was rendered insolvent thereby, and that the debtor
received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer. 220
The proofs are difficult because they require the plaintiff to value the debtor's
assets at the time of the transaction, and to establish that benefits-including
indirect and intangible benefits-received by the debtor as a result of the
transaction, were worth substantially less than the obligations that it thereby
incurred. 221
The second important consequence of a finding of actual intent is that the
2 16 See notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
217 A transfer may be avoidable as constructively fraudulent under most modem
fraudulent transfer law, including the U.F.C.A., the U.F.T.A., and Bankruptcy Code
section 548. Under such provisions generally, a transfer may be avoided as fraudulent
without regard to the intentions of the parties if at least two elements are present in the
transaction. The first is that the transferor received less than reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer. The second may be any of the following: the transferor was
insolvent Cin the bankruptcy sense) at the time of the transfer, or was thereby rendered
insolvent; the transfer left the transferor with less than adequate capital for its business or a
transaction in which it intended to engage; or at the time of the transfer, it intended or
expected to incur debts beyond its ability to repay. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994);
U.F.C.A. §§ 2-6; U.F.T.A. §§ 2, 4(a)(2), 5(a).
218 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1994); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1).
219 For example, the transferee of a constructively fraudulent transfer is entitled to a
lien on property turned over to the estate on fraudulent transfer avoidance for any value
given to the debtor; this is not available to a transferee who does not take in good faith. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(d)(1) (1994).
2 20 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
221 See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1988); Telefest, Inc. v.
VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1376, 1377-78 (D.NJ. 1984).
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defendant may be treated more harshly than in the case of a finding of
constructive fraud. In cases of constructive fraud, the transferee who is forced
to disgorge transferred property is entitled to a lien on property turned over to
the trustee, in the amount that the defendant transferred to the debtor in
exchange for the avoided transfer.222 If the fraud is found to be by actual
intent, on the other hand, the defendant, on turning over the property in
question to the trustee, keeps nothing. 223
2. Classification of Securities as Debt or Equity
With respect to junk bonds, the circularity problem relates directly to the
issue of whether the debt status of such securities is to be honored in
bankruptcy, or whether they are to be reclassified as equity by the bankruptcy
court.224 The securities may have characteristics such that the danger of
reclassification is real. If so, that is the kind of risk factor that ought to be
disclosed in offering materials under the securities laws. The danger, however,
is that a bankruptcy court, after the fact, would view the disclosure of the risk
in the offering materials as evidence of intent, and thus another factor to be
weighed in favor of reclassification.
3. In the Environmental Context
As noted above,22 5 environmental liabilities not only create enormous
potential liabilities, but may be factors both in precipitating bankruptcy and in
creating special risks within the context of a bankruptcy case.
Environmental liabilities interact with bankruptcy in several ways. The
most obvious is that environmental liabilities may be an important cause of
bankruptcy. More difficult problems, however, are created by the fact that
courts dealing with bankruptcy cases have not been good at allocating
environmental liabilities according to the normal rules for distribution of
bankruptcy estates among creditors. This means that creditors of debtors with
environmental problems may not be able to count upon receiving the
distributions which they might expect and to which they might otherwise be
entitled under the Bankruptcy Code.
In this context, as in others, circularity comes to pose special problems
because liabilities under environmental law may be affected by disclosure of the
222 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994); U.F.C.A. § 9(2); U.F.T.A. § 8(d).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir.
1986).
224 See generally Mendales, supra note 163.
225 See supra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
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problems in question. Liability under CERCLA may be based on ownership or
operation of property used for treating or disposing of toxic waste. 226 Liability
is without fault, and may apply to a secured lender who takes title to the
property on foreclosure, or to a lender who participates in management of a
debtor operating it.227 The only significant defense against such liability is
based on "innocent landowner" status. 228 Disclosure of risks under the
securities laws could help to undermine the assertion of this defense.
4. Dealing with Circularity
The strong form of the circularity problem appears amenable to resolution
along the lines adopted by the U.C.C. for transactions such as leases and
consignments, that exist on the frontiers between secured transactions and
transactions covered by bodies of law other than U.C.C. Article 9. Parties to a
transaction may, for example, intend it to be a lease of personal property. Such
a transaction, if a "true" lease, is outside the scope of Article 9, and does not
require the parties to file an Article 9 financing statement in order to protect the
lessor's interest in the property against third parties such as a trustee in
bankruptcy.
A lease of personal property, however, may be hard to distinguish from a
security interest coming within the scope of Article 9.229 If a third party later
attacks the lessor's interest, and a court determines that the parties have in fact
created a security interest rather than a lease, the lessor would be treated as an
unsecured creditor if he or she has not filed a proper financing statement under
Article 9.230
Given the absence of a clear line between leases and security transactions,
Article 9 has adopted an elegant solution to the dilemma of the lessor who is
concerned that the transaction may not be a lease, but is afraid that if he or she
files a protective financing statement, that act will be used as evidence that the
parties in fact intended to create a security interest. Article 9 permits a lessor in
this position23 1 to file an "informational" financing statement that will protect
his priority should a court find that the parties created a security interest rather
than a lease. To guard against the circularity problem in this context, Article 9
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
168-69 (4th Cir. 1988).
2 27 See Mirsky et al., supra note 168, at 633-34.
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
229 For the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between a lease of and a security
interest in personal property, see U.C.C. § 1-201(37) cmt. 37 (1995).
230 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1995); 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1994).
231 Presumably, the lessor does not wish to be found the "lessor" of two evils.
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provides that the filing of an informational document of this kind shall not of
itself constitute evidence that the parties intended to create a security
interest.23 2
Similarly, a court considering the problem of circularity in disclosure of
bankruptcy risks under the securities laws should find, as a matter of public
policy, that disclosure of a particular risk factor does not constitute a binding
legal characterization of the matter in question with regard to nonsecurities law.
Although a statutory provision to this effect, along lines similar to U.C.C.
section 9-408, would be preferable, in terms of certainty and clarity, to reliance
on widely-scattered bankruptcy courts, asking the latter to do so prior to the
adoption of a statute does not ask them to exceed their authority. Courts in
many different jurisdictions have, for example, long followed similar principles
of public policy in holding evidence of subsequent repairs or improvements
inadmissible to prove a tort defendant negligent.233
The weak form of the circularity problem is more difficult. The threat of
insolvency naturally spurs creditors to recover on obligations to them by
whatever means come to hand. New financial structures invite testing by
litigation, particularly if a structure is being used to obtain a higher credit
rating than its ultimate beneficiary would otherwise receive. The very weakness
of the ultimate beneficiary that compels using structures of this kind indicates
that it may be vulnerable to bankruptcy-and in that event, absent prior testing,
a wealthy finance subsidiary is the kind of target that a bankruptcy trustee,
acting for general creditors, is likely to find inviting.
Ultimately, the intractability of these considerations suggests a general
weakness in the whole fabric of disclosure as presently conceived. 234 Discrete
232 See U.C.C. § 9-408 (1995).
233 This rule (which has developed several exceptions not relevant here) has been
established by courts in most U.S. jurisdictions, and often codified by statute, including
Federal. Rule of Evidence. 407. Originally, the primary justification for the rule was that a
subsequent repair or improvement was irrelevant to the defendant's negligence at the time
of the tort. The public policy justification for the rule has developed more recently, holding
that if this kind of evidence is not excluded, potential defendants would be deterred from
making repairs or improvements after an accident. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester
Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (Cal. 1974) (en banc); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d
217, 223-24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So. 2d 774, 776
(Fla. 1955); Judson F. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Adndmssibility, 10 RUTGERS L.
REv. 574, 590-91 (1956).
234 It may appropriately be analogized to Russell's Paradox. Appreciation of Russell's
Paradox helped lead to Kurt G6del's more general proof of the incompleteness of formal
axiomatic systems. Russell's Paradox may be stated as follows: Consider the class of all
classes that are not members of themselves. Is it a member of itself?. If it is, then it is not; if
it is not, then it is. See generally, BERTRAND RUSSELL & ALFRED NORTH WHrrEHEAD,
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instances of circularity, such as the strong form, are amenable to solution; the
more general set of problems, described here as the weak form of circularity,
requires particular solutions appropriate to particular sets of facts. The most
general statement that one can make is simply that courts should be sensitive to
the problem, and should be particularly reluctant to impose securities law
liability for failure to disclose in situations where an issuer has made good faith
efforts to balance appropriate disclosure with the risks created by that
disclosure.
PRINCIrnA MATHEMATICA (2d ed. 1927). The paradox, considered in the context of formal
logical systems, demonstrates the difficulties that arise in such systems when they attempt to
make statements about themselves. G6del exploited these problems arising from self-
reference in formulating his proof. The theorem that he proved states that, in the context of
number theory, there exist well-formed statements that can neither be proven nor disproven
within the axioms and procedures of formal arithmetic. This theorem can be broadly
generalized to hold that for any nontrivial formal axiomatic system, there exist well-formed
statements that may neither be proven nor disproven within the axioms and procedures of
the system. See, e.g., ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEw MIND 99-108 (1989);
DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979); see
also, John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Lav from Self-
Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REv. 992 (1992); Bertolt Brecht, Das
Lied von der Unzulllnglichkeit Menschlichen Strebens, in DIE DREIGROSCHENOPER 77
(Suhrkamp Verlag ed. 1955) ("Ia, renn' nur nach dem Gliick/Doch renne nicht zu
sehr/Denn alle rennen nach dem Gliick/Das Gliick rennt hinterher," roughly translated
"Yes, run after happiness, but don't run too hard. For everyone runs after happiness-but
happiness is running behind them"). The problem of circularity, particularly in its more
general weak form, arises from the same nucleus of self-reference that lies at the core of
Russell's Paradox and the G6del incompleteness theorem. It should be noted that this is not
a claim that securities law, even insofar as it interacts with bankruptcy, is limited by Gidel
incompleteness; securities law is not a closed formal axiomatic system subject to the
theorem. The analogy is instructive, however, because circularity reflects the special
anomalies inherent where self-reference occurs. Problems arising from circularity have
been noted in other bodies of law, as with the problem of infinite regress seen in conflicts of
law under the rubric of renvoi. The analogy to incompleteness in formal logic is also helpful
in understanding the context of securities law disclosure when viewed in the light of its real
world consequences. The problem of incompleteness, while it precludes a complete formal
theory of mathematics, does not bar the use of mathematics in understanding the world. In
the same way, the existence of circularity does not prove that effective securities law
disclosure is impossible, but demonstrates the intractability of the problem of formulating
general rules to deal with all disclosure problems, or even the subset of disclosure problems
arising from the insolvency or potential insolvency of a securities issuer.
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V. THE CORPORATE EVENT HoRizON: DISCLOSURE ON THE APPROACH
TO BANKRUPTCY
... Man sieht vom Galgenberg die Welt anders an, und sieht andre
Dingen als Andre.23 5
As the financial state of an entity with outstanding securities evolves over
time, and particularly when it encounters difficulties that may threaten
insolvency, disclosure problems take on new dimensions. The normal
disclosure paradigm of the initial public offering to a general, liquid securities
market becomes less applicable; troubled issuers are attractive to fewer
investors who do not already hold their securities, and informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers grow substantially. 236
Substantive disclosure needs also change in this new environment. Correct
disclosure becomes not just a matter of correctly reporting business conditions
affecting the issuer's ability to pay its obligations under nonbankruptcy law, but
implicates changes in the rights of control that may be essential for effective
implementation of the goals of the reorganization process. Where common
shareholders have exclusive voting rights in the standard model, preferred
shareholders may acquire them as dividends are missed, 23 7 and bondholders
may acquire them as the issuer's situation passes from stressed normal
operations to workout to bankruptcy. 238 Even when these rights are not created
by contract, for example, in the indentures that establish the issuer's obligations
to holders of its debt securities, they may be established informally in the
workout negotiation process, and formally by bankruptcy law in a Chapter 11
reorganization. This last aspect of evolving control rights has been
insufficiently appreciated in the past, based on the discontinuity between
normal corporate operation and bankruptcy law. Absent correct disclosure,
holders of debt securities have tended to undervalue-and lose-rights to which
they should have been entitled.239
The question of what constitutes appropriate disclosure is particularly
difficult, however, because the question of cost becomes especially critical in
this context. The financially troubled corporation is less able to afford
disclosure costs than the average issuer, and it is therefore important to avoid
235 Christian Morgenstern, ALLE GALGENLIEDER 15 (Insel Taschenbuch ed.
1947). Roughly translated, "One looks at the world differently from the gallows hill,
and one perceives different things differently."
236 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1217-20.
237 See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 137, at 498-99.
238 See, e.g., id. at 381-82, 501.
239 See generally Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1357-58.
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imposing costs that could further jeopardize a successful workout or
reorganization, unless the benefits of the disclosure are clearly worth the added
risk.
A. The Need for Appropriate Disclosure
The approach to bankruptcy creates special disclosure requirements for
several reasons. Security holders' need for adequate information rises as their
level of risk increases, particularly since the approach to bankruptcy tends to be
especially productive of rumors. Without adequate information, they may
become prey to "vultures," selling their stakes for substantially less than real
value.240 Appropriate disclosure will thus help to level the playing field
between ordinary investors and specialists, and reduce incentives for improper
insider conduct. 241
Moreover, appropriate disclosure will help stakeholders to make better
decisions where asymmetry of information may have its most drastic
consequences: in dealing with management. This is true both on the approach
to bankruptcy, in deciding whether to support management workout proposals,
and in a Chapter 11 reorganization. In both cases, good information is
important both substantively, in helping investors appraise the value of their
claims, and procedurally, in advising them of their rights in the course of a
workout or bankruptcy. It may, for example, help them to overcome collective
action problems normally inherent in the position of scattered claimants with
relatively small interests by forming committees.242 The limited empirical data
on hand indicate, as might be expected, that investors who organize committees
tend to recover better proportions of their claims than those who do not.243
B. Continuing Disclosure and Bankruptcy Issues
The 1933 Act primarily deals with the initial distribution of securities.
Disclosure obligations do not end there, however. At that point, the 1934 Act,
which is primarily concerned with trading of securities on the secondary
240 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 3, at 1209 n.7, 1214, 1218-20, 1223.
241 See, e.g., In re Papereraft Corp., 187 B.R. 486, 494-97, 500, 502 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1995) (creditor who misused inside information on debtor to purchase claims at a
discount); Monzack v. A.D.B. Investors (In re Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc.), 149
B.R. 274, 279-81 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (subordinating secured creditor that misused inside
information to debenture holders).
242 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
243 See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 35; LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 61.
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markets, imposes continuing disclosure requirements, requiring issuers to
update information at regular intervals and to report particular events of major
significance. The disclosure of material information, whether or not intended as
disclosure for purposes of securities regulation, gives rise to continuing
responsibilities: even though correct when initially made, it will tend to become
misleading over time if not adequately updated.244
1. Regular Reporting Under the 1934 Act
The 1934 Act adds significantly to the disclosure duties of the issuers of
registered securities. Apart from initial registration, they are required to engage
in continuous disclosure to investors concerning their financial condition. This
begins with quarterly and annual reports. Moreover, and this is particularly
important for purposes of insolvency disclosure, continuous reporting
responsibility also includes disclosure outside the framework of normal
periodic reporting when events occur that are of central importance to the
registrants. 245 Additionally, issuers who are required to register under the 1934
Act are subject to special disclosure intended to properly inform security
holders about their rights in corporate governance, including the proxy
rules, 246 which control disclosure in the process of proxy solicitation, and the
Williams Act,247 controlling disclosure in the context of tender offers.
2. Reporting on the Onset of Distress: Trigger Points
A key issue that issuers must face in deciding when insolvency-related
disclosure must be made is when, if such disclosure was not appropriate under
the 1933 Act at the time of issue, circumstances have changed to a point at
244 See, e.g., Bomarko, Inc. v. Hemodynamics, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (W.D.
Mich. 1993).
245 The 1934 Act provides for registration independent of the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act. Section 12 (g)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1), requires an issuer
to register an issue of equity securities when it has more than 500 record holders and the
issuer has total assets over $5 million. Under 1934 Act section 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a),
an entity registering securities under the 1934 Act becomes a "reporting company" and
must comply with the Act's periodic reporting requirement. While this alone would
probably suffice to make most issuers reporting companies, 1934 Act section 15(d) and
Regulation 15D close a possible loophole by making all entities that register securities under
the 1933 Act comply with the 1934 Act's periodic reporting requirements. See, e.g., LARRY
D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRIEs LAWs 198-99 (3d ed. 1993).
246 See Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -. 14a-15 (1996) and Reg. 14C,
§ 240.14c-1 to -. 14c-7 (1996).
247 82 Stat. 456 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)).
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which management and its advisors must consider making such disclosure.
Clearly, it is required at the time management actually decides to make an
exchange offer or to file for bankruptcy; however, as we have seen, disclosure
will usually need to be made well before this point if it is to be truly effective.
Important trigger points will often be set by the issuer's contracts, both
with its security holders and its institutional lenders. Contracts of this kind
normally establish events of default, and these include not just actual failure to
make required payments, but early warning default events based on the
debtor's financial condition falling below certain preset levels.24 8 Where it
becomes reasonably clear that a debtor will enter default on one or more of its
contractual obligations, absent the occurrence of a contingency such as the sale
of property outside the ordinary course of business, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the debtor has entered the penumbra of insolvency, and the time
has become ripe for appropriate disclosure. Defaults that will create this kind of
trigger point include not just debt obligations, but preferred stock dividends
whose omission would impose contractual restrictions on the issuer's conduct.
Even where this kind of contractual default is not in sight, other events
may signal the transition from ordinary course of business to threatened
insolvency. This includes matters of public record, such as press reports and
the institution of lawsuits, and less public matters such as the disruption of
relationships with key creditors, including institutional lenders and major
suppliers. A key creditor's refusal to renew a line of credit will provide a
signal of this kind.
Ultimately, the identification of transition points may depend on factors
other than discrete events. On this, as on every other important responsibility
of corporate management, no mechanical algorithm will provide all the
answers; managers and their professional advisers will have to exercise
informed and skilled judgment. In some ways, this responsibility may prove
useful for reasons going beyond disclosure: it may force managers to take early
warnings of insolvency seriously and induce them to act more promptly than
they might otherwise do. 2 4 9
3. liming the Reporting of Workout and Bankruptcy Events
Reporting events relating to financial distress poses some difficult
questions. While the 1934 Act and related regulations unambiguously require
timely reporting of major corporate decisions such as a debtor's decision to file
248 See, e.g., Nielsen v. Greenwood, 849 F. Supp. 1233, 1238-39 (N.D. Il. 1994)
(making financial ratios such as cash flow to fixed charges conditions of default and of
blocking payments on subordinated obligations).
249 See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1357-58.
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a Chapter 11 petition, quick reporting of events of this kind can create major
difficulties. 250 Trade creditors, for example, are likely to cut off credit to a
debtor for the period between the announcement of a decision of this kind and
the actual filing of the petition, because credit granted during an interim period
will be a prepetition claim and therefore entitled to a lower bankruptcy priority
than claims accrued after a Chapter 11 petition. While no issue of this kind will
be raised if the announcement is made simultaneously with the filing, what of
authorization by a corporate board to file a petition contingent upon certain
events? This may be particularly important in the context of a workout
accompanied by a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan.
C. Special Problems of Disclosure on the Approach to Bankruptcy
1. The Transformation of Disclosure Needs
The balance of concerns that dictate what disclosure is appropriate changes
markedly as a corporation crosses the threshold from business as usual to the
edge of insolvency. The transition from solvency to insolvency is, from the
viewpoint of securities regulation, a transition from a general to a more
restricted market. Securities issued by a corporation on the spiral toward
insolvency are less attractive to a more general public, as potential purchasers
dwindle toward a small number of "vultures." At the same time, as the market
becomes thinner, holders of the securities are in greater need of accurate
information as to their alternative courses of action.251
2. Control of Insider Misconduct
Potential insider misconduct becomes particularly troubling as a corporate
debtor approaches insolvency. Collective action problems give insiders
particularly great leverage over debtholders in this context, both in workouts
and in bankruptcy reorganization. 252 Moreover, although considerations of
residual interest in an insolvent entity and legal rights such as debtholder voting
in the confirmation of reorganization plans put debtholders in a role more like
that traditionally ascribed to common shareholders, courts have been slow to
impose insider trading liability for transactions in debt securities.
The best approach here appears to be a unified one of placing insider
misconduct, both in contemplation of bankruptcy and after the filing of a
250 See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text (discussing circularity).
251 See supra notes 19, 146.
252 See supra note 32.
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bankruptcy petition, under securities law, with the primary enforcement
jurisdiction given to the SEC. In this context, a relatively slight modification of
securities law will be effective in dealing with the problem: during the one-year
period prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition,25 3 and at any time thereafter,
insider transactions with respect to all securities of a debtor corporation should
be treated in the same way as insider transactions with respect to equity
securities are currently treated.
The principal civil deterrents to insider misconduct in connection with a
bankruptcy case are ill-suited to deal with this kind of insider misconduct. The
most significant of these is equitable subordination under Bankruptcy Code
section 510(c), 25 4 pursuant to which a creditor who has acted inequitably
(particularly through misuse of an insider position) with regard to other
creditors can have its claim subordinated by order of the bankruptcy court to
those creditors disadvantaged by its actions. 255 Insider misconduct, however,
may not directly concern claims against the debtor, and their subordination may
not create a deterrent proportional to the seriousness of the conduct. Moreover,
equitable subordination motions normally require initiation by the creditors
adversely affected and are difficult and expensive to prosecute.
The Bankruptcy Code and associated legislation also provide certain
criminal penalties for bankruptcy fraud, but this tends to be defined in ways
that have little applicability to the kind of insider misconduct just described. 25 6
Moreover, responsibility for identifying and prosecuting bankruptcy fraud lies
primarily with the U.S. Trustee, whose authority is stretched too thinly in
having responsibility for monitoring misconduct in all bankruptcy cases before
it-not just the rarefied category of insider misconduct in large corporate
reorganizations 257-and the local U.S. Attorney in the relevant district, who
253 The period that bankruptcy law already provides for avoidance of preferences
given to insiders of a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994).
2 54 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).
255 See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel), 563 F.2d 692, 698-99 (5th Cir.
19T.
256 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-153 (1994) (criminal penalties provided for, inter
alia, fraudulent concealment of property of a debtor's estate; rendering a false oath,
statement or account in connection with a bankruptcy case; filing false claims in a
bankruptcy case; fraudulently receiving property from a debtor after a case is filed;
fraudulently offering, giving, or receiving compensation for acting or forbearing to act in a
bankruptcy case; fraudulently transferring or concealing property of a debtor in connection
with a bankruptcy case or with intent to defeat the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code;
destroying, falsifying, concealing, or mutilating records of a debtor, or withholding such
records from a court officer or other official entitled to their possession; or embezzlement of
property of a bankruptcy estate).
257 See, e.g., Mendales, supra note 35, at 1242-43, 1309.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
may be far too busy with violent or drug-related crime to pursue offenses of
this kind.
Here, securities law appears to provide a far more effective way of dealing
with insider misconduct than bankruptcy law. The law of insider trading is
highly developed, and needs comparatively little modification to be an effective
tool in the bankruptcy context. Moreover, the tools available for enforcement
are far superior; the SEC is far better equipped than any actor in the
bankruptcy system to investigate and deal with insider misconduct, which
strongly resembles insider misconduct in nonbankruptcy securities matters.
3. Special Considerations on Cost
Bankruptcy-oriented disclosure, particularly for a financially troubled
corporation, involves special considerations of cost going beyond those that
apply for other securities disclosure. These concerns must be given great
weight, because imposing new costs at too high a level could be the last straw
in forcing a business that might otherwise have achieved an out-of-court
workout in bankruptcy.258
Generally, however, aside from what should be a general concern that
disclosure be cost-effective, worry about cost should not prevent requiring
more elaborate disclosure of bankruptcy-related risk for a financially troubled
issuer. For one thing, it is in this context that it is most crucial for investors to
be informed of their rights in a possible bankruptcy of their issuer. Only high-
quality information on this will permit them to appropriately value exchange
offers, as opposed to their likely entitlements in a bankruptcy, and will prevent
them from being stampeded into accepting disadvantageous settlement offers
based on the mere threat of bankruptcy as an alternative. Moreover, complete
and accurate information here will maximize their ability to properly exercise
their rights as creditors in a reorganization-rights that the Bankruptcy Code
itself does not require a debtor to disclose to its creditors until the actual
circulation of disclosure statements concerning proposed plans of
reorganization late in the Chapter 11 process. 259
D. Disclosure Responsibilities on Filing for Bankruptcy
Filing a bankruptcy petition is an irrevocable transition point for an issuer,
which places it under an entirely new body of substantive and disclosure law:
that imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. The problem at the transition, from the
258 See SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 31, at 227-36.
259 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994); Mendales, supra note 35, at 1276-82.
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point of view of disclosure policy, is to insure that investors are meaningfully
aware of their rights under the new order, without imposing unnecessary costs
on the corporate debtor or adding to investor confusion through deliberate or
inadvertent obscurity.
Ironically, the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide for corporate-
oriented disclosure in this context. Following its original paradigm as a
procedure for liquidating the property of an individual or closely held business,
it does not provide for public notice at the commencement of a bankruptcy case
other than to specify filings that must be made with the bankruptcy court.260
Security holders receive notices as holders of claims or interests, and not, prior
to the release of a Chapter 11 disclosure statement as to a plan already
negotiated and being presented to them for approval, as potential participants in
negotiating the plan. 26 1 For securities law, on the other hand, bankruptcy is an
event that a corporation with continuing disclosure responsibilities must report,
but the extent of its reporting requirements is unclear.
The critical nature of the event dictates that a policy be established for
disclosure in this context. Moreover, it is desirable that responsibility be
apportioned to one body of law or another, rather than being shared. This is
true both for the convenience of investors in the debtor corporation, and to
avoid confusion based on inconsistent disclosure-a risk that is amplified by the
possibility that bankruptcy and corporate disclosure may be drafted by two
different sets of differently specialized lawyers.
E. Entering the Central Singularity: Disclosure Under the Securities
Laws After a Bankruptcy Filing
After the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, disclosure anomalies increase.
Among other things, continuous reporting obligations under the 1934 Act are
not changed by the fact of reorganization, although bankruptcy law imposes its
own disclosure responsibilities. 262 Moreover, the problem of cost looms larger.
Cash is precious to a reorganizing corporation, and each incremental expense
increases the probability that the reorganization will fail. 263 The ultimate bearer
of these costs, therefore, may be less the debtor itself than its creditors.
While it is clear from the foregoing analysis that more disclosure is
necessary, even after a bankruptcy filing, than the Bankruptcy Code currently
260 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 1104-08 (1994); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)-(d).
261 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994); see also, Kaufman v. Public Service Co. of N.H.
(In re Public Service of N.H.), 43 F.3d 763, 766 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1959
(1995).262 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4), 1125(d), 1145(a) (1994).
263 See SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 31, at 235-36, 242-44.
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requires, the problem of cost makes it undesirable to continue requiring the full
normal panoply of securities disclosure, as if the bankruptcy filing had not
taken place. Statutes provide a blunt instrument for balancing this tension, so
that amendment of the 1934 Act to change reporting requirements for
corporations in Chapter 11 will not, of itself, suffice. A better solution, taking
advantage of the flexibility of administrative rule-making, would be to
authorize the SEC to modify ongoing disclosure rules for corporations that are
operating under Chapter 11 protection. 264 Moreover, given the broad spectrum
of differing financial conditions of corporations in Chapter 11, it appears
desirable to give the SEC staff additional flexibility in enforcing disclosure
regulations for reporting entities while the latter are reorganizing under Chapter
11.
VI. LIABiLrTY: INCENTIVES AND THE LAW OF DIscLOsuRE
The foregoing discussion of appropriate disclosure of bankruptcy risks
would be incomplete without some consideration of the liabilities that may be
imposed for nondisclosure. Absent proper allocation of liabilities, both existing
incentives and business and legal cultures will tend to operate against
disclosure.
While new disclosure standards make little sense without allocating
responsibilities and corresponding liabilities for the disclosure, one must also
be concerned with creating costs, in the form of unnecessary litigation and
inappropriate or excessive liabilities, that could exceed the benefits of improved
disclosure. It is therefore important to consider what parties are most
appropriately subject to new responsibilities for disclosure and what the limits
of their potential liability should be.
A. The Costs of Enforcing Higher Standards of Disclosure
New bankruptcy disclosure requirements may not be cheap. They could
impose substantial direct costs, particularly in terms of legal fees imposed on
issuers, and administrative costs created by expanding the role of the SEC.
Moreover, they may impose even more substantial indirect costs, particularly
in the form of new litigation. If new disclosure responsibilities are to be
created, therefore, special care is needed to assure that they will be cost-
effective.
264 See generally Mendales, supra note 35, at 1304-05.
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B. Allocating Liability
The securities laws establish a broad spectrum of parties liable for failures
in disclosure. Moreover, there are important differences in the types of
liability: criminal liability for violations of the antifraud provisions of the
securities law;265 civil liability in SEC-initiated proceedings, generally for
injunctive relief;266 and, most important, civil liability to purchasers and
holders of affected securities, usually in damages.267
These liabilities are important not just to those who may be subject to
them, but to the effectiveness of the disclosure process. Liability is what gives
teeth to the regulatory regime. Failure to impose liability on important actors,
or imposition of liability on inappropriate actors or to an inappropriate degree,
may cause serious distortions of the process.
1. Issuers
Normally, issuers are primary targets for nondisclosure liability, both in
terms of SEC-initiated injunctive actions and damage or rescission actions by
private plaintiffs. They are, for example, the only parties without a due
diligence defense for negligent nondisclosure under the 1933 Act. 268
Unlike the situations involving securities law liability outside of
bankruptcy,269 issuers do not make good targets for enforcement by private
plaintiffs in disclosure-related cases involving insolvency-related issues. This is
because, for bankruptcy-related disclosure to come into question, an issuer will
have to be bankrupt. It will thus not be a deep pocket to start with; and
bankruptcy principles will impose barriers to recovery beyond basic lack of
financial capacity.
First, claims of this type will, for bankruptcy purposes, be prepetition
claims, that is, claims that arose at or before the filing of the bankruptcy
265 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77x, 78ff (1994).
266 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a) (1981 & West Supp. 1996); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 781(t),
(k) (1994).267 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(a), (1994); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 196-97 (1976) (a private remedy for violation of section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule lob-5 has been created by case law).
268 See 1933 Act section 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994).
269 Issuers are normally primary targets for suits based on material misrepresentations
or omissions from a securities registration statement, since they are not given the "due
diligence" defense available to other parties under § 11(b) of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n(b) (1994).
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petition.270 This means that parties holding them will be barred by the
automatic stay in bankruptcy from asserting them during the course of the
bankruptcy case, except as claims filed with the bankruptcy court.2 71 If the
bankruptcy is a Chapter 7 liquidation, this will be the end of the story for the
security holders, since there will be no corporate entity surviving the
bankruptcy against whom to assert their claims. 272
Even in the event of a successful Chapter 11 case, holders of claims of this
kind will not normally be able to assert them against a reorganized successor to
the issuer after bankruptcy, because the confirmation of a reorganization plan
normally discharges the debtor from substantially all debts except insofar as the
plan provides for them.273
The claims will be assertable in the issuer's bankruptcy case. This,
however, is unlikely to be a boon to claimholders, since they will be
subordinated to the claims of holders of equal or equivalent seniority. 274 Any
claims based on securities law violations will thus not normally improve their
positions over those represented by the mere holding of the securities in
question.
The one exception to this rule would exist if purchasers of the securities in
question could prove actual fraud by the issuer in the offering. Under
Bankruptcy Code sections 523(a)(2) and 1141(d)(2), 275 such proof, if made
pursuant to a complaint filed on a timely basis with the bankruptcy court, could
result in the holders' claims being declared nondischargeable. 276 This would
not affect their priority in the reorganization case itself, but would permit the
holders to assert their claims against the reorganized entity after confirmation
270 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1994).
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
272 A corporation's debts may not be discharged in a liquidation under 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(1) (1994). This provision is designed to bar transactions in corporate shells. See
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. The
nondischargeability of corporate debt leaves no alternative to a liquidated corporation but
dissolution under state corporate law. See 4 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 727.01 [2] (Laurence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
273 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1994). The most important exception to this rule is the
situation in which the debtor confirms a liquidating plan of reorganization-the functional
equivalent of a Chapter 7, but in which the debtor's management or a group agreed upon by
creditors, rather than a Chapter 7 trustee, supervises the liquidation, and where the
liquidation process itself attempts to maximize value beyond the level of a Chapter 7 fire
sale. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1994) denies a discharge in Chapter 11 to a liquidating
debtor.
274 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1994).
275 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), 1141(d)(2) (1994).
276 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (d), 1141(d)(2) (1994).
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of its plan. Proof would be difficult, however, because the elements that must
be established for nondischargeability are even harder to establish than the
scienter required to establish securities law liability under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule lOb-5. 277
2. Affiliates of Issuers
Persons affiliated with a bankrupt issuer will provide much more effective
targets for private securities law litigation over improper or omitted
bankruptcy-related disclosure. They are attractive as targets not only because
the factors that make the debtor itself uninteresting do not apply to them, but
because actions against them may proceed despite the debtor's own
bankruptcy. 278 Litigation against persons other than the debtor in a Chapter 11
case is not barred by the automatic stay in bankruptcy,27 9 and courts are
reluctant to extend the stay to include persons affiliated with the debtor barring
compelling circumstances.
Persons who have control over a corporate issuer are particularly at risk in
this context.28 0 This potential liability is not limited to persons with actual
control, but extends to those with potential power to influence the issuer's
actions. 28 1 It includes those with formal positions giving them this kind of
277 For the elements that must be established for nondischargeability, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a) (1994). For the requirements under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also, Joseph A. Grundfest, Di'mplying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Lavs: 7e Commission's Authority, 107
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994).
278 See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder See. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(plaintiff holders of securities of bankrupt corporation named officers, directors, large
shareholders, underwriters, and auditors as defendants), aff'd in pertinent part, 35 F.3d
1407, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994).
279 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
280 See section 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988); 1934 Act, section 20(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994); Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d
1130, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1992) (control person liability will be found if the person in
question actually exercised general control over the entity principally liable, or if the person
had power or ability to control the transaction or activity in question); Harrison v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1992); Damato v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (power to control
activity in question needed to establish control person liability therefrom); Bomarko, Inc. v.
Hemodynamics, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1335, 1339, 1342 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Louis Loss, 7he
Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARv. L. REv. 908, 911-13 (1992).
281 See In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602, 618 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
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potential power, such as officers and directors282-including outside directors-
and it may extend to others as well, including professionals working with an
issuer. This responsibility applies to directors whether or not they actually sign
the registration statement for a particular securities issue; their chief defense
against liability for incomplete or defective disclosure is due diligence. 283
3. Underwriters
Underwriters will be among the most appropriate targets for allocation of
liability for failures in disclosure, particularly under section 11 of the 1933
Act. 284 They are among the best parties to monitor issuer disclosure, both
because of their accustomed role in due diligence, and because of their
gatekeeper position in allowing issuers to get their securities to market.285
Moreover, their position gives them the deepest pockets of any group of
potential defendants in private securities litigation, giving them both ample
means and incentives to make sure that disclosure is done correctly. 286
Section 11(a)(5) of the 1933 Act 2 87 makes underwriters liable to purchasers
of securities registered under the Act for any material misstatement or omission
in a registration statement. The chief defense available to a defendant
underwriter against such liability is that of "due diligence": that it had made a
"reasonable investigation," which gave it no reason to believe that the
registration statement contained a material misstatement or omission. 288 The
due diligence defense is further modified by the issue of whether the defendant
is entitled to rely upon experts.289 Its usefulness lies chiefly in the incentives
that it gives underwriters, who have important bargaining power in dealing
282 It should be noted, however, that merely holding a particular corporate office will
not, in and of itself, give rise to control person liability under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.
See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Cryomedical
Sciences, Inc. See. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1001, 1020 (D. Md. 1995).
283 See 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994); Section of Bus. Law, American Bar Ass'n, Corporate
Director's Guidebook-1994 Edition, 49 Bus. L. 1247, 1278 (1994).
284 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); see Dannenberg v. PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Software
Toolworks Inc.), 50 F.3d 615, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1994).
285 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
286 See Sherrie R. Savett & Robert P. Frutkin, Drafting a Prospectus to Avoid Liability
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, in SECuRITIEs LITIGATION: PROSECurION
AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES, at 92 (Practicing Law Institute, Corp. Law & Practice
Handbook Series No. 492, 1985).
287 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1994).
288 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1994); Dannenberg, 50 F.3d at 621-22.
289 See Dannenberg, 50 F.3d at 623 (underwriter need not conduct due diligence for
"expertised" part of prospectus).
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with issuers, to monitor issuer disclosure and assure that it is correct.
It is particularly helpful to give underwriters this kind of responsibility in
connection with bankruptcy-oriented disclosure, because their business gives
them the kind of expertise that particular issuers may lack as to the
effectiveness of particular financial structures and their bankruptcy risk over
time. A particular issuer may never have issued asset-backed securities before;
its underwriters will have seen many such issues, and may in fact have devised
particular structures and therefore be better acquainted with the particular risks
that a given structure will impose on a given issuer. Moreover, an
underwriter's experience over time will tend to acquaint it with examples of
failed structures, and this experience too qualifies it as a party well-suited to
ascertain, and disclose, appropriate risk.
Underwriters' liability is also important in this context because it will serve
to counter pressures on them, in the context of an increasingly competitive
market for their services, to look the other way when issuers cut corners on
disclosure. Moreover, particularly with respect to disclosure of structural
weaknesses in securities with special sensitivity to insolvency, it will give them
important incentives to think on a long-term basis, countering pressures, from
factors such as market volatility and competitive pressures to constantly
introduce new variations on securities structures, to think only of the near term.
4. Issuers' Counsel and Other Experts
a. Issuers' Counsel
Issuers' counsel are also good parties to whom to assign disclosure
responsibilities enforced by potential liabilities, though it will be more difficult
to impose liability upon them than upon underwriters. 290 There are several
possible bases for such liability, despite the Supreme Court's recent action in
cutting off more than thirty years of doctrine on aiding and abetting liability. 291
The surviving forms of potential liability include primary liability under the
1933 Act and primary liability under the 1934 Act, particularly section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 292 Moreover, professionals who assist a securities transaction,
290 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (attorneys
may be liable for violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.,
760 F. Supp. 1239, 1249-50 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
291 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994).
292 See id. at 1455; Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846-49 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Rule 10b-5 claim stated against attorney who consented to distribution of opinion letter to
agents of investors, where opinion letter may have contained reckless misrepresentation).
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such as attorneys and accountants, even though not themselves named as
defendants, may be liable for contribution to actual defendants, if the
professionals' conduct could serve as a basis for direct liability. 293
Attorney liability for securities law violations has long been controversial.
Although the federal securities laws do not impose the degree of explicit
regulation on attorneys that they do on accountants, the SEC has attempted to
regulate attorneys engaged in securities practice, and encountered severe
resistance in the process. 294
Nonetheless, issuers' counsel are highly appropriate parties to rely upon
for pushing issuers to appropriate disclosure, and therefore for bearing the risk
of nondisclosure. They have ultimate legal responsibility for ascertaining the
likely consequences of a particular security structure. Moreover, they may be
the only parties with continuing responsibility to monitor the legal
consequences of a deteriorating issuer financial position over time.
Imposing liability upon them may also be appropriate because of factors
governing them that, absent liability, may provide incentives for them to err on
the side of nondisclosure. These include what may be called cultural lag: a
failure to keep up with legal evolution both in bankruptcy law and in the new
types of securities that may be affected by it. Moreover, as with underwriters,
the market for legal services has evolved in ways that, without corrective
liability, provide incentives for corner-cutting. As the market for corporate
legal advice has become more competitive, severe pressures have been exerted
both on the charges that lawyers may make for their services and on their
ability to resist issuer pressure to sugarcoat disclosure. Potential liability for
failure to disclose is one of the few factors likely to be effective as a
counterweight to these pressures.
b. Other E&perts
Issuers' counsel present a special case. The considerations that may impose
liability on them will, in most cases, also apply to other experts whose advice
is used in preparing disclosure materials. Accountants appear most frequently
in this expert role, but other specialists whom the issuer and its underwriters
rely on, such as nonunderwriter financial advisers, are subject to similar
considerations. 295
293 See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 297
(1993).
294 See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978);
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAvID LUBAN, LEGAL EThics 259-61 (2d ed. 1995); GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. Er AL., THE LAWAND ETHIcs oFLAWYRNG 112-27 (2d ed. 1994).
295 See Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1153, 1161-62 (6th Cir. 1994)
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5. Underwriters' Counsel
While underwriters' counsel play an essential role in their clients'
monitoring of issuer compliance with disclosure standards, they do not appear
to be good parties to whom to allocate new direct disclosure liabilities under
the securities laws. Their disclosure compliance appears to be most effectively
assured by indirect liability, by way of malpractice claims asserted by clients
who have incurred liability through their negligence. 296
There are several reasons why it does not appear to be effective to allocate
new direct liabilities to them. It is unlikely that the requisite privity exists for
liability to securities holders in most circumstances, although the underwriting
context raises interesting ethical problems for counsel. Courts have generally
been reluctant to allow the kind of open-ended liability that could be created if
privity were to be ignored, and the sophistication of the clients in this situation
appears to assure that potential malpractice claims will be sufficient to assure
adequate quality control.
6. Other Creditors of Issuers
Other creditors of the issuer-especially institutional lenders-could be
targeted for potential liability as deep pockets if they have, in the course of the
debtor-creditor relationship, made themselves insiders of the debtor. Lender
liability, however, has proven difficult to establish, 297 and there are no cases in
which the asserted basis of liability depended upon the securities laws. Here,
the remoteness of potentially liable parties from involvement in securities
transactions argues against creating new duties in them, at least in their capacity
as creditors. The costs of imposing such duties would seem clearly to outweigh
any benefits.
C. Limitations on Liability
Not only the allocation of liability among the various actors in the
disclosure process, but also its extent, needs to be regulated in order to assure
(feasibility consultant for retirement facility held potentially liable for misrepresentations in
offering materials).
296 See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2048,
2055-56 (1994); Bruce A. Friedman & Kenneth S. Meyers, Secuitides Law, NAT'L L.J.,
July 11, 1994, atB5, B6.
297 See, e.g., Cam Corp. v. Continental Bank (In re Cam Corp.), 148 B.R. 760, 773-
75 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (debtor failed to prove that lender had acquired control sufficient to put
it under fiduciary duty to disclose to create lender liability).
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that the costs of disclosure requirements do not exceed its benefits. If new
liabilities mean no more than an open-ended invitation to new litigation, with
boilerplate complaints ground out every time an issuer finds itself in financial
distress, new disclosure requirements will be worse than useless.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the evolution of bankruptcy
risks that requires disclosure of the kind discussed here is that it has been rapid
and requires a substantial degree of technical sophistication. It is therefore
important that, where new liabilities are to be based upon new regulations, the
regulations be specific, and that they be regularly updated to assure that
liabilities are consistent with actual market developments. Moreover, to the
extent that private remedies are to be allowed, it appears desirable that the SEC
be authorized by statute to define their scope and extent; in some
circumstances, where the agency decides that it should have exclusive
jurisdiction to bring actions, it should be permitted so to limit available
remedies.298
VII. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy, like other fields in which the law has evolved rapidly in recent
years,299 requires corresponding adaptation by securities disclosure law if the
latter is to accomplish its own purposes. Treating bankruptcy as a mere
endpoint no longer accurately reflects the risks and opportunities faced by
investors in many situations concerning publicly held securities. Rather,
investors will need to know the ways in which the values of their investments
may be affected by the bankruptcy process and, in some cases, by their own
participation in that process. While mandatory disclosure will impose certain
costs both on issuers and investors, none of the potential substitutes for such
disclosure can completely take its place. In fact, these potential substitutes,
particularly securities ratings, analysts, and the financial press, will function
more efficiently with a more sophisticated structure of mandatory disclosure.
Bankruptcy and workouts, for their part, will enjoy reciprocal benefits
from greater sophistication in securities law disclosure. Investors will be better
able to exercise their rights in both, making workouts more practicable in some
cases where Chapter 11 reorganizations would otherwise be needed, and aiding
in the formulation of more efficient and equitable plans of reorganization in
cases where Chapter 11 proves indispensable. In some cases, better
understanding on the part of participants may lead to more timely pulling of the
plug on unsalvageable enterprises, resulting in fewer "Bleak House"
298 See generally Grundfest, supra note 277.
299 One of these fields is environmental law. See supra notes 164-79 and
accompanying text.
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situations3°° in which transaction costs run amok to consume funds that might
otherwise be returned to investors.
Finally, it should be stressed that this set of problems and proposed
solutions is not static, but rapidly evolving. Accordingly, the adequacy of
disclosure rules will require regulators to be nimble in keeping up to date with
new types of securities and developments in reorganization, and in being
flexible, willing and able to amend and apply disclosure rules in ways that
maximize cost effectiveness for the entire process.
300 See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin
Books 1971) (1853).
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